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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Labor supply has gained importance in connection with the prediction of a decrease
in Germany’s labor force potential (Fuchs et al., 2016). In this regard, the current
debate especially focuses on mothers for whom the employment potential is consid-
ered to be high. Issues like the reconciliation of family and work life and flexible
working time arrangements rank high on the political agenda. Examples for poli-
cies having become effective over the last years vary from the introduction of the
right to reduce working time in 2001 to the extension of parental leave eligibility in
2007 or the expansion of subsidized early child care culminating in the legal claim
for a child care slot for children younger than three years old in 2013 (compare Fig-
ure 1.1). Apart from the political framework, employers are also increasingly mak-
ing use of flexible working time arrangements like working hours accounts (Ellguth
et al., 2018). While flexible working time measures are mainly employer-oriented
and allow for sudden labor demand adjustments, employee-friendly arrangements
are expected to become more important in the future (Zapf and Weber, 2017).
This thesis examines individual labor supply at different life stages with a special
focus on working hour preferences and maternal employment. It consists of three
articles each represented by a chapter. As a starting point, the first article analyzes
the factors contributing to the evolution of working hour discrepancies. Since the
empirical results show that especially mothers are concerned by those discrepan-
cies, Chapters 3 and 4 evaluate different family policies with the potential to avoid
and solve working hour discrepancies of young mothers. These policies relate to the
availability of public child care and paid maternity leave.
1.1 Agreed, actual and preferred working hours
Before going into detail further, the concepts of agreed, actual and preferred work-
ing hours have to be explained. Agreed working hours typically refer to contracted
or usually performed working hours while actual working hours also depict tem-
poral fluctuations such as overtime hours. Working hour preferences represent the
individual notion of what is desirable and are generally questioned in surveys. In
Germany, the Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the Microcencus are the main
data sources. Both surveys condition working hour preferences on income such that
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FIGURE 1.1: Selected German reforms between 2001 and 2019
Abbreviations: Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz (TzBfG), Kinderförderungsgesetz (KiföG).
Source: Own representation.
FIGURE 1.2: Working hour discrepancies over time in %
(a) Women (b) Men
Notes: The sample includes between 4,778 and 14,877 observations per year. Self-employed, apprentices, interns
and individuals completing their civilian or military service are not considered. Actual working hours (per week)
include over time hours. Preferred working hours (per week) are not observed in 1996. Underemployment:
preferred-actual hours> 2.5, overemployment: preferred-actual hours < −2.5, no/small discrepancy: preferred-
actual hours ≥ −2.5 & preferred-actual hours ≤ 2.5.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEPlong v34, 1991-2017. Weighted analysis.
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respondents are free to indicate their preferences without internalizing any other
restrictions. Other differences in the questionnaire design of the GSOEP and Mi-
crocensus can lead to statistical variation. E.g., the Microcensus, in contrast to the
GSOEP, filters the survey question on working hour preferences. Before indicating
the amount of desirable hours, the respondent has to answer if she or he wants to
change agreed working hours. Hence, respondents of the GSOEP may feel free to
also indicate small changes such that the GSOEP statistics are expected to be an up-
per bound for working hour discrepancies (Holst and Bringmann, 2016). Moreover,
in contrast to underemployment (wish for an increase of hours), the indication of
overemployment (wish for a decline of hours) is voluntary in the Microcensus. Thus,
the share of overemployed may be underestimated. This thesis uses both data from
the GSOEP and Microcensus: Chapter 2 exploits the panel structure of the GSOEP
whereas Chapter 3 makes use of the larger sample size of the Microcensus. As the
research question of the latter article focuses on young mothers, the underestimation
of overemployment is expected to be less severe.
The unifying result of the two data sources is that actual or agreed and preferred
working hours do not necessarily coincide leading to overemployment or underem-
ployment. As highlighted by Figure 1.2, using GSOEP data, more than one half of
German employees express preference for working less or more while the majority
belongs to the first group. Furthermore, male hour discrepancies, although on a high
level, turn out to be mostly stable since German reunification. The share of under-
employed women, however, has risen over the last years motivating the emphasis of
this thesis. The concept of working hour preferences has the potential to broaden the
perspective and to offer complete insight in individual labor supply. Adjusting ac-
tual working hours for those currently underemployed increases the aggregate work
volume (Ehing, 2014). Furthermore, employees affected by working hour discrep-
ancies show lower levels of life, health and work satisfaction (Grözinger et al., 2008).
Hence, realizing or avoiding working hour discrepancies can have strong welfare
effects (Bryan, 2007).
If the majority of German employees experience working hour discrepancies, which
factors can explain their occurrence? Actual and preferred working hours are sub-
ject to individual, family and employer interests and thus, change accordingly but
not necessarily in line with each other. They depend on the individual life or career
stage that are shaped by occurring life events. Especially the birth of a child shapes
the decision on the division of work within a household (e.g., Schulz and Blossfeld,
2006: for Germany). Although gender roles have converged for the last decades, dif-
ferences between genders in terms of paid working hours and unpaid housework
hours remain (Wanger, 2015). Maternal preference for an hour reduction might be
only temporary, however it can mark future employment including career opportu-
nities, earnings and social prospects after retiring. Goldin (2014) finds for the United
States that maternal labor supply is even further decreasing some years after the
birth of a child. This kind of path dependence is also present in Germany where
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traditional employment patterns reinforce the longer a couple is married (Schulz
and Blossfeld, 2006). While women usually reduce employment after the birth of
a child, empirical studies result in slight paternal compensations by offering more
hours to offset the decline in household income (Drago et al., 2009; Pollmann-Schult
and Reynolds, 2017; Reynolds and Johnson, 2012). Similarly, young fathers express
only small preference for working hour reductions. However, cohort comparisons
provide evidence that attitudes have changed as younger cohorts of fathers reduce
actual working hours by one to two weekly hours in case the partner holds a full-
time job (Pollmann-Schult and Reynolds, 2017). Nevertheless, these results highlight
the strong family dependence of female employment careers.
1.2 Structure of this thesis
This thesis builds on these findings and is structured in three essays as follows. The
first article analyzes the development of hour discrepancies by focusing on the most
relevant household and job characteristics related to the creation and resolution of
hours constraints. As creating or solving an hour discrepancy can also depend on the
time already spent in the state of not having or having a discrepancy respectively, the
empirical analysis is based on a discrete duration model controlling for individual
fixed effects and using annual panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP). The findings show that the occupational context, i.e., the individual job
autonomy, is related to the evolution of working hour discrepancies for both women
and men. In higher job positions individuals are more likely to become and remain
overemployed. In contrast, the importance of household factors demonstrates gen-
der differences and reveals that motherhood is linked to a lower probability for be-
coming underemployed, but the probability to leave this state is also smaller.
Hence, the following two chapters examine the subgroup of young mothers who
have been in the focus of two recent social policies. Using the exogenous nature
of these reforms, both studies pursue the identification of causal effects. The sec-
ond article evaluates the effectiveness of the German child care expansion for under
three-year-olds culminating in a legal claim for a child care slot (compare Figure
1.1, written in bold) in the context of female labor supply. Complementary to the
first article, this chapter concentrates on the adjustment of agreed versus preferred
working hours as the availability of low-cost external child care might have affected
them differently. E.g., underemployed mothers might have responded to the reform
by an increase of agreed working hours. Going back to Figure 1.2a, one can indeed
detect a slight decrease of female underemployment after the legal claim for subsi-
dized child care became effective in 2013. To rule out any spurious correlation, the
article uses the exogenous rise of child care provision for difference-in-differences
estimation and compares districts with a large increase of the child care coverage
rate to those with a smaller child care expansion. The findings suggest that on aver-
age agreed and preferred working hours increase in response to the reform and that
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the effect size is quite similar amounting to about five hours per week. Interestingly,
only cohabiting mothers are characterized by a larger increase of agreed working
hours in contrast to preferred working hours. This finding emphasizes the potential
of child care provision in societies with a traditional division of household labor. In
Germany, most mothers have a part-time working contract while the father works
in full-time (Wanger, 2015).
Promoting an early return to work in part-time after childbirth is the main objec-
tive of the parental leave reform in 2015 (compare Figure 1.1, written in bold). The
last chapter evaluates its effect on maternal employment with a special focus on
the working time pattern. As prior studies mainly focus on the timing of the re-
turn to work and thus, the extensive employment margin (e.g., Baker and Milligan,
2008; Dahl et al., 2016), this article contributes to the literature by analyzing the in-
tensive margin. In 2015, the German government decided to double the maximum
receipt duration of a part-time subsidy right after the birth of a child. The dynamic
optimization problem developed in the article proposes that the policy has an am-
biguous effect on the decision when to return to work, but it makes part-time work
more attractive relative to full-time work. This incentive may imply worse medium
to long run employment prospects if mothers remain (involuntarily) part-time em-
ployed. Long working hours are related to better career opportunities and even
considered to be one of the "last chapter" (Goldin, 2014) for reducing the gender
wage gap. However, the empirical findings of the article cannot confirm such a part-
time trap caused by the policy up to the child’s second birthday. The reform rather
yields additional employment of about two percentage points up to the first birth-
day. These effects are mainly driven by part-time employment of those mothers who
would have also returned in part-time in absence of the reform, as the results do not
show a decrease of full-time employment. The machine learning augmented estima-
tion strategy also allows to estimate heterogenous effects. The heterogeneity analysis
demonstrates that medium-earners and prior part-time working mothers have the
strongest response to the new policy. Unfortunately, the administrative character
of the data does not allow to examine individual working hour preferences which
could further inform on those mothers unwilling to take up the part-time subsidy.
Hence, the article cannot definitely answer if social norms, the lack of child care fa-
cilities or too low financial incentives are the driving forces.
The following three chapters include the articles as intended for publication in sci-
entific journals. A conclusion ends this thesis.

7Chapter 2
The creation and resolution of
discrepancies between preferred
and actual working hours over the
life course
Joint with Prof. Dr. Enzo Weberab
Abstract: This article contributes to the analysis of working hour discrepancies, i.e.,
under- and overemployment, by exploring how they emerge and resolve with spe-
cial consideration of the household context. It uses a rich longitudinal data set, the
German Socio-economic Panel, for a discrete duration analysis controlling for un-
observed heterogeneity. We focus on the most relevant household and job charac-
teristics. Findings suggest that job autonomy plays a crucial role for the creation
and resolution of discrepancies. We especially contribute to previous studies by
also examining path dependence and find that both the creation and resolution of
discrepancies are characterized by positive duration dependence, but by negative
occurrence dependence.
Keywords: working hour preferences, working hour discrepancies, household con-
text, life course, working-time arrangements
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2.1 Introduction
Discrepancies between preferred and actual working hours are a common pheno-
menon in industrialized countries (Reynolds, 2003, 2004; Stier and Lewin-Epstein,
2003). Empirical studies show that a discrepancy between working hour wishes
and actual hours does not only deteriorate life, health or work satisfaction, but real-
ization of working hour preferences can also strengthen the employment potential
which is especially important in aging societies (Ehing, 2014). Hence, impeding the
creation or supporting the resolution of working hour discrepancies can have pos-
itive welfare effects (Bryan, 2007). The underlying study seeks to further inform
these debates by providing evidence on the dynamics of hour discrepancies, i.e.,
creation and resolution, in a household context. Several studies for different coun-
tries agree that the family context is one key determinant in addition to job and firm
characteristics (Drago et al., 2005; Ehing, 2014; Fagan, 2001; Merz, 2002; Pollmann-
Schult, 2009; Reynolds, 2003). Especially children are a determinant for under- and
overemployment, i.e., the wish for an hour increase or decrease respectively. Empir-
ical findings suggest that mothers are less likely to be underemployed while fathers
do not prefer an hour reduction (Ehing, 2014; Pollmann-Schult, 2009). Gender dis-
parities also show up concerning the presence of a partner. Single women tend to
be under- rather than overemployed, but men without a partner have a lower prob-
ability for wanting an increase in labor supply. These findings emphasize that men
and women are differently affected by time and monetary constraints imposed on
the household. Apart from the family background higher levels of education and in-
come determine overemployment (Pollmann-Schult, 2009; Reynolds, 2003) whereas
underemployment is characterized by medium levels of education and low incomes
(Ehing, 2014). While explaining the presence of working hour discrepancies, these
studies take a cross-sectional point of view, i.e., they neglect the development of
working hour discrepancies over time. Reynolds and Aletraris (2006, 2010) analyze
the creation and resolution mechanism of an hour discrepancy using Australian and
US data respectively. Reynolds and Aletraris (2006) emphasize that both a change in
preferred and/or actual hours contribute to creating and solving over- or underem-
ployment, but preferred hours are of higher importance. Furthermore, both studies
find that a discrepancy of preferred and actual hours persists over time, especially
the desire for fewer hours is hard to implement. This article contributes to the exist-
ing literature on working hour discrepancies in two ways. Firstly, by exploiting rich
panel data, the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP, 1985-2016), for a longitudinal
life course approach, which also allows a detailed view on the household and its em-
ployment situation. Beyond that, as a methodological advancement, by strengthen-
ing causal interpretations as the GSOEP not only enables to examine the individual
development of working hour discrepancies over a long time period, but also allows
to control for unobserved individual characteristics and cohort effects. In a discrete
duration analysis (Allison, 1982), taking unobserved heterogeneity into account, this
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article examines how different individual and household characteristics contribute
to the creation and resolution of working hour discrepancies over time. Hence, not
the presence of working hour discrepancies, but their development is analyzed. In
this context, the panel structure enables to consider path dependence. The German
labor market serves as an interesting example as it is a country where the traditional
employment pattern is still wide spread providing potential for working hour dis-
crepancies (Wanger, 2015). The findings suggest that the individual job autonomy
is one of the main driving forces for the creation and resolution of working hour
discrepancies. Further interesting results concern the path dependence of working
hour discrepancies. Both the creation and resolution of under- and overemployment
become more likely the longer the current spell continues, but less likely the more
spells already occurred in the past. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 deals
with theoretical considerations. Section 2.3 includes a description of the data and of
the estimation strategy. The regression results can be found in Section 2.4. The last
section concludes with a discussion.
2.2 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses
Standard labor supply theory suggests that individuals are free to choose their work-
ing hours according to their preferences. Deviating from neoclassical considerations,
economists highlight the existence of market imperfections (e.g., Bryan, 2007). So-
ciologists emphasize the role of changing preferences for justifying working hour
discrepancies (Clarkberg and Moen, 2001; Reynolds and Aletraris, 2006). A com-
mon feature is that both approaches suggest that individuals are differently affected
by a discrepancy of preferred and actual working hours dependent on their life stage
including, e.g., the formation of the household, marriage, and the education of chil-
dren. Thus, working hour discrepancies should not only be examined from the
individual’s perspective, but enclose the broader household context. The analysis
provides a broad perspective and focuses on five main factors: the family compo-
sition, institutional constraints, the individual occupational position, the individual
career stage and duration-related characteristics of the working hour discrepancy.
For better readability, Table 2.1 summarizes the proposed hypotheses.
2.2.1 Family composition
Longitudinal research on the development of working hour discrepancies over time
is scarce. However, a change in the life situation affects preferred hours (Campbell
and van Wanrooy, 2013). Events in an individual’s life like the arrival and departure
of children are examples for altering working hour preferences. Discrepancies are
likely to be created if an adjustment of the actual number of hours is hard to imple-
ment.
Social role models are an important factor for explaining traditional employment
patterns that imply a full-time working man whose partner supplies a reduced amount
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of hours and has the main responsibility for the household. The majority of German
women states the reason for their part-time employment to be family duties while
the most important factor for men is that a full-time job cannot be found (Wanger,
2015). Although the employment rate of women has risen over the last decades, a
major female conflict stems from reconciling housework and job (Hochschild and
Machung, 1989) providing potential for working hour discrepancies. Men also face
expectations in terms of male breadwinning which is considered to be crucial for
compensating potential female income losses (Kaufman and Uhlenberg, 2000) or for
the masculine identity (Potuchek, 1997). Hence, normative and time or monetary in-
terdependencies within the household can cause both women and men not to supply
the amount of hours they actually want to provide.
As women are more likely to suffer from the conflict of being simultaneously the
ideal homemaker and worker, mothers should be even more affected by working
time discrepancies than childless women (Reynolds, 2004). Suppose a full-time em-
ployed mother carries out the bulk of the domestic work including the care for chil-
dren. If her children are younger, she is more willing to reduce her working hours, and thus,
an hours constraint should evolve with a lower probability. However, when children grow
older, working preferences rise again resulting in a higher (lower) probability for getting
under- (over-) employed in comparison with childless women.
Apart from varying preferences due to changed life situations, resignation or settling
can also be of importance in consideration of the resolution of hour discrepancies. It
describes the circumstance individuals develop a preference for the working hours
they can get (Reynolds and Aletraris, 2006). Underemployed mothers might be more
willing to adapt to their lower actual hours which helps solving the discrepancy while an
adjustment of preferences is harder to achieve for overemployed mothers.
Fathers face different social expectations. Although gender roles have been chang-
ing, traditional employment patterns persist (Wanger, 2015). Men are supposed to
financially support their families (Potuchek, 1997) whereas a preference for an hour
reduction might be interpreted as a lack of job commitment (Fagan, 2001). Hence, fa-
thers should be more (less) likely to end up in overemployment (underemployment) compared
to childless men. On the other hand, solving a preference for less hours should be harder and
thus, overemployment of fathers be characterized by a higher persistence. In contrast, un-
deremployment is expected to be solved easier as actual working hours can adjust to higher
preferences.
2.2.2 Institutional constraints and interventions
We focus on reform effects in two important policy fields. Firstly, Germany un-
derwent a large expansion of especially early child care facilities over the last 20
years (legal claim to kindergarten in 1996, Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz in 2005, Tages-
förderungsgesetz in 2008). As increased availability and lower prices of child care in-
centivizes employment, but also reduces inter-role conflicts (Greenhaus and Beutell,
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TABLE 2.1: Summary of hypotheses
Creation of Resolution of
under- over- under- over-
employed employed employed employed
Children (Reference No children)
Mothers of young children − − + −
Mothers of older children + − + −
Fathers − + + −
Child care expansion − − + +
Legal claim for a part-time job + − − +
Job autonomy − + + −
Career stages
Earlier stages + + − −
Middle stages (Reference)
Later stages + + − −
Path dependence
Duration dependence − − + +
Occurrence dependence + + − −
Notes: + suggests a higher probability for creating/solving a discrepancy. − suggests a lower probability for
creating/solving a discrepancy.
Source: Own representation.
1985) and creates cultural acceptance (Zoch and Hondralis, 2017) we expect that work-
ing hour discrepancies are less likely to emerge and easier to become solved.
Secondly, since 2001, German employees in firms with more than 15 employees have
a legal claim for a part-time job independently from their family background. We ex-
pect that this institutional change reduces the risk of becoming and staying overemployed.
However, it has also the potential for making the creation and persistence of underemploy-
ment more likely by specifying a fixed amount of hours one cannot easily increase at a later
point in time.
2.2.3 Job characteristics
The divergence of working hour wishes and actual hours can also be expected to
differ with respect to the individual occupational position. The normative signalling
power of long working hours is especially high in professional and managerial po-
sitions characterized by non-standard tasks the results of which are hard to assess
(Landers et al., 1996). Thus, overemployment should more likely emerge and also persist
in such positions compared to lower-rank jobs. For the same reasoning, underemployment is
supposed to occur less likely in high-rank occupations. Furthermore, it is expected that the
resolution of underemployment is more difficult for lower job positions and worse chances to
change the employer as these characteristics deterioate one’s bargaining position (Reynolds
and Aletraris, 2010).
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2.2.4 Career stages
Furthermore, besides family duties and role models, market imperfections like asym-
metric information can explain why actual working hours diverge from the pre-
ferred amount of hours. As long working hours serve as a signal of productivity to
the employer, employees offer working hours that exceed their preferences (Sousa-
Poza and Ziegler, 2003). Long working hours are especially important when individ-
uals suffer from financial insecurity or the lack of job alternatives which forces them
to accept job conditions they would otherwise reject (Stewart and Swaffield, 1997).
However, job insecurity also matters for accepting and remaining in jobs if prefer-
ences exceed actual hours. This argumentation particularly holds during early life
stages when employees still have to prove themselves or pursue a promotion and
have less financial resources or shortly before retiring with worse reemployment
chances and an increasing risk of health restrictions (Gielen, 2009). Therefore, employ-
ees should be more likely to create and less likely to solve a working hour discrepancy in
earlier and late phases compared to middle stages.
2.2.5 Path dependence
The data and methodological approach allow for analyzing issues of path depen-
dence. Two different forms of path dependence are distinguished. The first one re-
lates to the duration of the current spell (duration dependence), the second one to the
number of spells occurred in the past (occurrence dependence) (compare Heckman
and Borjas, 1980). Regarding duration dependence, one may expect that individu-
als sort themselves into the state of (not) having a discrepancy. Hence, transitions
into under- or overemployment (i.e., creation) are assumed to be negatively related
to the duration spent in a non-discrepancy state. I.e., the longer preferences match to
actual working hours, the less likely would under- or overemployment occur. For the res-
olution of discrepancies, discouragement or resignation may matter leading to an
adjustment of preferences the longer a discrepancy lasts (Reynolds and Aletraris,
2006). However, from the perspective of utility theory, marginal costs of a discrep-
ancy would increase the longer the spell already lasts, so that efforts to adjust actual
working hours would increase, too. Thus, the more time spent in under- or overemploy-
ment, the more likely employees are to leave this state either by an adjustment of preferred or
actual working hours (positive duration dependence). While both channels cannot work
at the same time for the same person, we will investigate the relevance of both ad-
justment mechanisms. As for the transition into unemployment, past experience of
working hour discrepancies is expected to increase the probability for having another spell
of under- or overemployment, since individuals are more willing to accept bad job offers or
working time arrangements (Gibbons and Katz, 1991). For the same reasoning, persis-
tence of discrepancies is more likely for those with previous spells.
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2.3 Data, variables and estimation strategy
2.3.1 Data
To evaluate working hour discrepancies and their dynamics over time, panel data
giving information on preferred and actual working hours over a long time span is
needed. The GSOEP as an annual repeated household survey fulfills both criteria
(see Wagner et al., 2007: for more details). Conducted since 1984, the GSOEP firstly
only covered West-German households. After the German reunification also East-
German households were interviewed and included in the analysis. The survey is
designed to cover both economic and sociological questions such as the current life
situation, employment, income and health, but also attitudes and different concepts
of satisfaction. It has the great advantage that not only individual data is a hand, but
also information on other household members which allows to approach the topic
from a comprehensive household context. All individuals older than 16 years in the
period from 1985 until 2016 are included. The waves of 1984 and 1996 have to be
omitted as they do not contain information on working hour wishes. Extreme val-
ues of more than 80 hours per week (actual or preferred), as well as discrepancies
exceeding a difference of 70 hours are dropped.
2.3.2 Outcome variables, data preparation and estimation strategy
Currently employed respondents are asked the following questions about their pre-
ferred and actual working hours: "If you could choose your own work hours, taking
into account that your income would change according to the number of hours, how
many hours would you want to work per week?" and "How many hours do you
generally work per week, including any overtime?". Hence, actual hours diverge
from agreed hours by including overtime.1 The wording of these questions turns
out to be meaningful, e.g., filtering the question on working hour preferences in-
fluences the amount of hours the respondent indicates (Holst and Bringmann, 2016).
Stating a preference on working hours might furthermore be complex as individuals
evaluate different background circumstances like the household income and house-
hold duties simultaneously. Hence, Campbell and van Wanrooy (2013) emphasize to
consider preferences not as pre-determined and stable values. A working hour dis-
crepancy discri,t for individual i at time t is defined as the difference of desired and
actual hours exceeding a threshold x such that underemployed respondents have
a positive and overemployed employees a negative discrepancy. The threshold of
2.5 weekly hours in the baseline estimations is in line with previous studies (Knaus
and Otterbach, 2019) and will turn out to be robust. The binary outcome variables
1Marginal and self-employed do not indicate agreed working hours. As these groups are included
in the analysis, it is relied on the measure actual working hours.
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indicate the creation (discr_crei,t) and resolution (discr_resi,t) of a working hour dis-
crepancy conditioned on the previous survey year:
discr_crei,t =
1 if |discri,t| ≥ x and |discri,t−1| < x0 else
and
discr_resi,t =
1 if |discri,t| < x and |discri,t−1| ≥ x0 else .
The last lines of Panel A in Table 2.2 show that women have in equal shares no dis-
crepancy or are overemployed. Most men are overemployed while the numbers also
demonstrate that women are more often underemployed compared to men. These
findings are very similar to other European surveys like the British Household Panel
Survey (Bryan, 2007). Besides, women have similar working hour wishes indepen-
dent from having no discrepancy or being under- or overemployed. For those expe-
riencing a discrepancy, the absolute difference between preferred and actual hours
amounts to about 10 weekly hours which is comparable to the male hour discrep-
ancy. However, underemployed men have a weekly working hour wish of about 43
hours while for the overemployed it amounts to only 37 hours.
As the focus of the analysis lies on the emergence and resolution of a working hour
discrepancy over time, the original panel data set has to be transformed into spell
data. That means for those individuals for whom a discrepancy evolves, preferred
and actual hours have to coincide at the first period of the spell. Table 2.3 repre-
sents possible preparation examples for two individuals like in Willett and Singer
(1995). Individual 1 experiences two spells of an discrepancy creation, whereas the
first spell of individual 2 is right-censored and not characterized by a discrepancy
creation. For the resolution of a discrepancy, preferred and actual hours diverge at
the beginning of the spell and data is prepared analogously. Getting non-employed
is not considered as a resolution mechanism.
Panel B of Table 2.2 shows how many individuals create or solve a discrepancy in
each period. In the first period both discr_cre and discr_res equal zero as a starting
point. One period later, e.g., 1,547 women (about 61 percent of those women ever
becoming underemployed and currently being in the second period) have become
underemployed. This share is quite similarly decreasing by gender and discrepancy
type such that those with long duration without discrepancy are on average less
likely to create one. However, those with long discrepancy duration are also less
likely to leave this state. A striking finding is that among underemployed men the
percentage for leaving this state is relatively high in the second period (about 72 per-
cent), but lower for leaving overemployment (about 49 percent). To examine to what
extent these unconditional correlations are related to other variables of interest we
use duration analysis.
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TABLE 2.2: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables
Women Men
Panel A Hour distribution over discrepancy types
nd ue oe nd ue oe
Preferred working 29.91 30.20 30.35 39.52 43.15 37.26
hours Mean
Actual working 30.17 19.83 40.55 39.77 32.17 47.89
hours Mean
Difference between -0.26 10.37 -10.20 -0.25 10.98 -10.63
preferred and actual
hours Mean
N 39,920 16,046 39,839 46,598 9,801 59,228
% 41.67 16.75 41.58 40.30 8.48 51.22
Panel B Number of individuals creating/solving a discrepancy over time
Creation Resolution Creation Resolution
discr_cre = 1 discr_res = 1 discr_cre = 1 discr_res = 1
ue oe ue oe ue oe ue oe
1st period N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2nd period N 1,547 3,375 1,772 2,775 1,008 4,859 1,511 3,763
% 60.91 59.95 63.81 53.77 57.11 59.25 72.44 48.79
3rd period N 418 1,021 497 892 324 1,457 304 1,433
% 47.61 49.76 54.32 41.18 47.72 48.23 56.19 39.79
4th period N 163 416 171 433 129 576 109 664
% 39.37 44.59 45.36 37.04 41.21 40.39 50.00 33.62
≥ 5th period N 169 392 158 483 117 612 91 874
% 28.94 36.10 36.66 27.62 33.82 34.63 41.55 26.61
N 2,297 5,204 2,598 4,583 1,578 7,504 2,015 6,734
Notes: nd=no discrepancy, ue=underemployed, oe=overemployed.
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP v33.1, 1985-2016. Pooled analysis in Panel A.
16 Chapter 2. Discrepancies between preferred and actual working hours
TABLE 2.3: Preparation as person-spell-period
data set
individual spell period discr discr_cre
(hours) (binary)
1 1 1 1.5 0
1 1 2 3.5 1
1 2 1 2.0 0
1 2 2 2.0 0
1 2 3 4.0 1
2 1 1 -0.5 0
2 1 2 1.5 0
2 1 3 0.5 0
Notes: discr measures the difference of preferred and actual
weekly hours. discr_cre depicts whether a discrepancy has be-
come created (1) or not (0). Analog data preparation for the
resolution of hour discrepancies.
Source: Representation as in Willett and Singer (1995).
It allows to analyze the dynamics of working hour discrepancies in dependence
from various factors. As annual panel data is at hand, a discrete duration analysis
(Allison, 1982) is conducted where the dependent variables discr_creit and discr_resit
are binary indicators for creating and solving the discrepancy. In order to take un-
observed heterogeneity into account, the fixed-effects or conditional logit estimator
(Chamberlain, 1984) is used. Like the fixed effects estimator, the conditional logit
estimator differences time-constant variables including unobserved characteristics
out. Considering the role of social norms for the division of labor within the house-
hold, this property of the estimator is valuable as it is difficult to find a suitable proxy
for the normative aspect. In this context social values are as well important. As at-
titudes, especially concerning the working time arrangement of men and women,
have likely changed between the different cohorts included in the data set, the elim-
ination of such factors is important for getting unbiased estimates. The probability
for a positive outcome of discr_crei,t or discr_resi,t is
P(discr_crei,t = 1|X1, ...XT, ci) = Λ(Xtβ+ ci) = e
Xtβ+ci
1+ eXtβ+ci
;
P(discr_resi,t = 1|X1, ...XT, ci) = Λ(Xtγ+ ci) = e
Xtγ+ci
1+ eXtγ+ci
whereΛ(·) denotes the logistic distribution, X a matrix of regressors and ci individual-
specific, time-constant factors. The contribution of an observation to the likelihood
function depends on whether the outcome variable changes at least once, e.g., with
only two observational periods T = 2, the probability for discr_crei,2 = 1 [discr_resi,2 =
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1] conditional on discr_crei,1 + discr_crei,2 = 1 [discr_resi,1 + discr_resi,2 = 1] becomes
P(discr_crei,2 = 1|X1, X2, ci, discr_crei,1 + discr_crei,2 = 1)
= Λ((X2 − X1)β)
[P(discr_resi,2 = 1|X1, X2, ci, discr_resi,1 + discr_resi,2 = 1)
= Λ((X2 − X1)γ)]
which is independent from ci. Alternatively, one may estimate a competing risk
model with multinomial logistic regression (compare Reynolds and Aletraris, 2010)
that can also differentiate between transitions from under- to overemployment and
vice versa. However, this kind of transition was found to be rare (about four percent
of all changes for both kinds).
2.3.3 Explanatory variables
The explanatory variables of interest include different characteristics considering the
individual him-/herself and the household he/she lives in. While the discussion of
results will concentrate on the proposed hypotheses, we will provide a complete de-
scription of other included covariates in this section.
Firstly, a variable for the life course dimension is defined depicting important tran-
sitions in an individual’s working life (Settersten Jr and Mayer, 1997) as they are the
learning phase, the beginning of the working career, the establishment in the job, a
middle phase and the years before and after retirement. The learning phase is cre-
ated upon the question if the respondent is currently receiving education or training
(vocational and further training or university) up to an age of 36 years. Once the
learning phase has passed, individuals change to the three years-lasting stage of the
career start which always refers to the highest level of education achieved. Hence,
for persons with a vocational degree who decide to go to college, the career start will
be postponed to the period after university. By the same token, breaks of unemploy-
ment after the learning phase are not taken into account. The phase of establishment
in the working life lasts for five years after the stage of the career start. It is followed
by the middle stage that is divided into two parts at the age of 45. The phase be-
fore retirement is defined upon the age and it includes individuals of 56 years and
older. Workers older than 65 years are captured in the retirement phase and con-
sidered separately, as working beyond the statutory retirement age is supposed to
be characterized by special conditions such as financial needs or high motivation.
As respondents can enter the survey at each life stage, there are cases where phases
cannot be determined successively starting from the learning phase. For those the
weighted median age for each survey year of the persons from the already succes-
sively determined career start stage is used. According to the achieved educational
level, the median age assigns life stage membership.
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Furthermore, not only a categorical variable representing the children’s age is in-
cluded, but also the daily hours of child care provided by the parents themselves
(coded 0 for childless individuals) and a measure of institutional child care, depict-
ing whether the youngest child is in part- or full-time care or not in institutional care,
are controlled for. In addition, the daily hours of housekeeping describe the hours
spent for unpaid work. The daily hours for child care and housekeeping might be
subject to an endogeneity problem as these variables can be determined simultane-
ously with the dependent variable. While this problem cannot be definitely solved,
potential biases are mitigated by instrumenting those variables with their first lag,
i.e., linear predictions of the first stage regression are inserted in the second stage2.
To depict the individual and the partner’s occupational position, the autonomy with-
in the job (a generated variable strongly correlated with the job classification ISCO
or the Prestige Scale of Treiman, 1976) is used. It describes the complexity or dif-
ferentiation of tasks and responsibilities connected with them. The duration spent
(un-)constrained is depicted by two variables. One measures the length of the spell
until the discrepancy has occurred or been solved while the first and second period
as well as the periods exceeding the fifth are grouped due to the small number of
observations with long duration. The second depicts the number of spells that have
occurred before the current spell. Again, more than two or three spells are grouped
in categories.
Furthermore, we consider important institutional changes over the last years, i.e.,
the legal claim to work part-time and the expansion of child care facilities, which
also allows to account for systematic differences across East and West Germany. For
the latter aspect the binary indicator for young children is interacted with dummy
variables standing for important periods defined by child care reforms (legal claim
to kindergarten in 1996, Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz in 2005, Tagesförderungsgesetz in
2008). To take the legal claim to work part-time in firms with more than 15 employ-
ees into account, an interaction of the post-reform years with firm size that is greater
than 20 employees, the next available threshold in the GSOEP, is considered. Hence,
the resulting estimate gives the coefficient for treated employees.
Apart from these characteristics, other aspects of the individual, her/his partner, the
firm side and the labor market are included as control variables. Education (no de-
gree, vocational or university degree) and the gross wage are considered. The latter
is based on the gross monthly individual income divided by the agreed working
hours per month. Overtime allowances are considered in this calculation with a fac-
tor of 1.25.3 Tenure and experience in full- or part-time work and in unemployment
are included to depict the employment history. Besides the partner’s occupational
autonomy, her/his characteristics are represented by the employment status and the
daily hours spent on child care and housekeeping. These variables are interacted
2We run linear regressions of each potential endogenous variable on all other included covariates.
The resulting predictions are used in the second stage.
3The agreed monthly working hours are generated by multiplying the weekly hours with the factor
4.348.
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with a binary indicator for the presence/activity of the partner and the partner’s
hours spent on child care and housekeeping are instrumented by their first lags.4 A
dummy for changing the job within or to another firm and the number of employ-
ees depict the firm side. Occupational labor market tightness, i.e., the number of
vacancies divided by the number of unemployed control for the occupation-specific
labor market situation. These numbers are taken from official statistics of the Federal
Employment Agency according to the job classification system KldB88 and KldB10.
Besides, a regional dummy for East Germany as well as a quadratic time trend are in-
cluded. Summary statistics of the most relevant explanatory variables can be found
in Table A.1 in the appendix.
2.4 Estimation results
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 depict the estimation results for becoming and leaving over- and
underemployed conditioned on gender. About 7,000 observations of about 2,000
women are included in the sample of underemployment. In the male sample one
can observe about 1,000 men and 5,000 data points. The overemployed samples are
larger with about 15,000 observations of almost 4,000 women and more than 23,000
observations of 5,000 men. Each individual included in the sample experiences the
creation or resolution of a discrepancy at least once and between 26 (resolution of
male underemployment) and 52 percent (resolution of male overemployment) of
them at least twice. The estimation is based on individual within-variation over
time so that standard errors might be large for coefficients of variables with less
changes. This applies to the children’s age (about 5 percent of switches), the ed-
ucational degree (1 to 2 percent of switches) and the presence of a partner (4 to 7
percent of switches). The analysis also contains a single fully interacted model that
includes both under- and overemployed to identify statistically significant differ-
ences between both groups. These are indicated by an italic odds ratio in Tables 2.4
and 2.5.
2.4.1 Creation of a working hour discrepancy
Familiy characteristics
The first rows of Table 2.4 show that the odds ratios of having children reveals dis-
parities between genders. In general, children are linked to a lower probability for
women to become under- and overemployed. The odds ratios are strongly pro-
nounced for mothers of younger children. This finding contradicts the results of
Reynolds and Johnson (2012) for the US who find that the transition from no to one
child increases the size of a discrepancy. Other transitions within the family of their
4Wunder and Heineck (2013) additionally look at the partner’s hour discrepancy and Reynolds
(2014) at hour preferences couples have for each other. Partner spillovers, however, are not in the
focus of this paper.
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analysis have less explanatory power. Fathers have a higher probability for getting
underemployed when their children become older, but the odds ratio is not statis-
tically significant. Thus, the expectation how discrepancies evolve for parents can
only be supported for mothers of young children and female overemployment in
general. Expectations do not hold for fathers.
Institutional constraints and interventions
Although the expansion of subsidized child care shows an increase of children insti-
tutionally cared for, the interaction of a dummy depicting stages for the expansion
of child care with a dummy for children younger than six years old does not hint
at changes regarding the creation of under- and overemployment which does not
support expectations.5 However, the pure, not interacted coefficient of institutional
child care seems to matter. When children enter part-time care, their parents are
more likely to become under- or overemployed, e.g., the odds for the creation of
female underemployment are 4.7 times higher compared to a full-time slot. The co-
efficient is less strongly measured for the lack of care facilities. A possible reason is
selectivity leading parents with a lower work commitment or for whom child care
costs are too high to care for their children on their own.
Secondly, since 2001 there is a legal claim to work part-time in firms with more than
15 employees. We consider an interaction of the post-reform years with firm size that
is greater than 20 employees, the next available threshold in the GSOEP and find that
women affected by the legal claim to work part-time have on average a lower odds
to get underemployed (0.628). Other interaction terms show no statistical relevance.
Job characteristics
Considering the occupational characteristics, it becomes obvious that reaching a
higher level of occupational autonomy leads to a higher probability for becoming
overemployed. The strong odds ratio of the latter is likely to be connected to peer
pressure and weakly delimited workload, but can also be seen in the context of cer-
tain individuals having preferences for a steeper career path, which involves both
higher autonomy and long working hours. The emergence of female underemploy-
ment is quite independent from the occupational autonomy. In contrast, the odds of
getting underemployed are significantly lower for men switching into higher posi-
tions than into jobs of lower autonomy. To sum up, the results indicate a time con-
flict for jobs of higher autonomy and responsibility which supports the proposed
hypotheses.
5For better readability, these results are not shown in Table 2.4. See Appendix A, Table A.2 for
additional estimation results.
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Career stages
The creation of a discrepancy follows a hump-shaped pattern with regard to the ca-
reer stages. It is less likely to become under- or overemployed when switching to
later career stages compared to the middle stage. Women are less likely to become
underemployed and men less likely to become overemployed when starting the ca-
reer. However, for women the odds of an overemployment creation are higher than
in the middle stage, e.g., 1.6 times higher during establishing. For men the odds
for becoming underemployed are also higher when they start their careers, but the
coefficient is less precisely measured. Hence, the expectation that the occurrence
of working hour discrepancies is more likely during earlier life stages can only be
supported for the creation of female overemployment. Against expectations, both
women and men show lower creation probabilities at later stages in life.
Path dependence
Further interesting results concern the life course dimension. The results hint at
positive duration dependence, i.e., the more time spent in a non-discrepancy state,
the more likely the occurrence of a discrepancy which does not support expecta-
tions. Besides, for those with multiple spells, i.e., those who have already solved a
discrepancy, the emergence of another discrepancy is considerably less likely. This
suggests that they do not show a higher willingness to accept bad working time
arrangements.
Adjustment margin
In a second specification it is analyzed which of the adjustment mechanisms, pre-
ferred or actual working hours, prevails by introducing dummies for an increase/
decrease (decrease/increase) of preferred/actual hours in case of underemployment
(overemployment). While these dummies are obviously endogenous with regard
to the left hand side, the regression exercise is taken as descriptive evidence as in
Reynolds and Aletraris (2006). Similar to these authors, the odds ratios show that a
change of preferred hours is more important than a change of actual hours (about
1.4 to 2.2 times), but that both margins matter for the creation of hour discrepan-
cies. As more than one quarter of observations within each sample (women/men,
over-/underemployment) are characterized by an adjustment of preferred and/or
actual hours, both turn out to be empirically relevant. The number of changes of
preferred and actual hours is similar apart from the creation of female underem-
ployment where the adjustment of preferences is stronger pronounced.
2.4.2 Resolution of a working hour discrepancy
Besides the creation of hour discrepancies, the life-course-oriented setting further
allows analyzing the factors influencing how an existing discrepancy can be solved.
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TABLE 2.4: Estimation results for the creation of a discrepancy
Women Men Women Men
Underemployment Overemployment
1 Family characteristics: Children (Reference No children)
Children le6 0.0769** (-2.11) 0.762 (-0.40) 0.309*** (-2.62) 0.710 (-1.04)
Children le10 0.257 (-1.02) 1.139 (-0.18) 0.365** (-2.21) 0.773 (-0.72)
Children le15 0.275 (-0.98) 1.457 (-0.50) 0.383** (-2.21) 0.874 (-0.40)
2 Job characteristic: Occupational autonomy (Reference Middle=3)
Apprenticeship 0.533 (-1.56) 0.883 (-0.34) 0.489*** (-2.60) 0.611** (-2.09)
Low=1 1.311 (-1.41) 1.037 (-0.16) 0.614*** (-3.11) 0.914 (-0.79)
2 1.236* (-1.65) 1.107 (-0.53) 0.854* (-1.80) 0.890 (-1.38)
4 1.342 (-1.25) 0.687* (-1.70) 1.289** (-2.35) 1.168* (-1.87)
High=5 1.232 (-0.26) 0.565 (-1.12) 1.188 (-0.69) 1.529*** (-2.61)
3 Career stages (Reference Middle stage up to 45 years)
Learning stage 0.135*** (-2.99) 0.871 (-0.27) 0.618 (-1.50) 0.507*** (-3.07)
Career start 0.329*** (-2.74) 1.229 (-0.50) 1.168 (-0.68) 0.525*** (-3.72)
Establishing 0.892 (-0.39) 1.182 (-0.54) 1.557** (-2.48) 0.881 (-1.07)
Middle stage 1.098 (-0.48) 0.889 (-0.36) 0.778* (-1.86) 0.744*** (-2.75)
up to 55 years
Pre-retirement 1.233 (-0.62) 0.724 (-0.58) 0.741 (-1.41) 0.707** (-2.08)
Retirement 0.704 (-0.52) 0.116 (-0.82) 0.329** (-2.13) 0.235*** (-2.98)
4 Path dependence
Period (Reference 1st and 2nd period)
3rd period 6.139*** (-17.32) 5.680*** (-12.73) 4.917*** (-23.77) 4.931*** (-29.74)
4th period 10.870*** (-13.70) 9.156*** (-10.46) 7.448*** (-17.67) 6.263*** (-21.91)
5th period 14.040*** (-9.99) 10.80*** (-7.90) 9.933*** (-13.29) 7.402*** (-17.98)
Spell (Reference 1st spell)
2nd spell 0.041*** (-14.17) 0.028*** (-11.23) 0.0819*** (-20.75) 0.102*** (-26.79)
3rd spell 0.0105*** (-18.35) 0.0144*** (-25.11)
N 7,303 5,121 15,884 23,343
n 1,895 1,335 3,950 5,454
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) of fixed effects-logit estimation. Instead of providing marginal effects, odds ratios
are indicated as they do not require plugging in a value for the unobserved component. The odds ratio gives the multiplicative
value for the odds if the explanatory variable increases by one unit. t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are bootstrapped with
1,000 replications. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.010. Other than listed explanatory variables are previously mentioned.
Abbreviations: Children le6 (le10, le15) means younger than 7 (11, 16) years old.
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP v33.1, 1985-2016.
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TABLE 2.5: Estimation results for the resolution of a discrepancy
Women Men Women Men
Underemployment Overemployment
1 Family characteristics: Children (Reference No children)
Children le6 0.0665** (-2.56) 2.698 (-1.25) 0.574 (-1.09) 1.192 (-0.53)
Children le10 0.312 (-1.10) 1.547 (-0.56) 0.736 (-0.60) 1.310 (-0.75)
Children le15 0.284 (-1.23) 1.888 (-0.84) 0.719 (-0.67) 1.199 (-0.53)
2 Job characteristic: Occupational autonomy (Reference Middle=3)
Apprenticeship 1.569 -1.46 1.548 (-1.21) 0.523** (-2.12) 1.054 (-0.19)
Low=1 0.586*** (-2.92) 0.812 (-0.91) 1.164 (-0.95) 1.277** (-1.99)
2 0.896 (-0.90) 0.912 (-0.47) 1.084 (-0.90) 1.137 (-1.46)
4 1.125 (-0.60) 1.226 (-1.05) 0.729*** (-2.66) 0.825** (-2.05)
High=5 0.749 (-0.26) 2.211 (-1.64) 1.281 (-0.82) 0.792 (-1.46)
3 Career stages (Reference Middle stage up to 45 years)
Learning stage 0.377* (-1.66) 0.255*** (-2.69) 0.989 (-0.03) 1.130 (-0.49)
Career start 0.894 (-0.26) 0.377** (-2.27) 1.160 (-0.58) 1.200 (-1.05)
Establishing 1.206 -0.630 0.697 (-1.22) 1.759*** (-3.02) 1.054 (-0.43)
Middle stage 0.926 (-0.37) 0.765 (-0.96) 0.933 (-0.50) 0.818* (-1.82)
up to 55 years
Pre-retirement 1.098 (-0.27) 0.581 (-1.06) 0.916 (-0.42) 0.741* (-1.70)
Retirement 3.040 (-1.05) 0.169 (-1.38) 1.861 (-1.21) 1.003 (-0.01)
4 Path dependence
Period (Reference 1st and 2nd period)
3rd period 7.359*** (-18.10) 8.228*** (-13.47) 3.939*** (-21.23) 4.061*** (-28.17)
4th period 12.50*** (-14.39) 21.98*** (-10.76 5.488*** (-17.7) 5.162*** (-21.43))
5th period 16.67*** (-10.59) 62.60*** (-8.54) 6.024*** (-12.52) 5.641*** (-17.26)
Spell (Reference 1st spell)
2nd spell 0.042*** (-13.28) 0.054*** (-8.83) 0.071*** (-18.29) 0.073*** (-25.54)
3rd spell 0.009*** (-16.69) 0.008*** (-24.27)
N 7,545 5,333 15,964 25,041
n 2,165 1,702 3,493 4,894
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) of fixed effects-logit estimation. Instead of providing marginal effects, odds
ratios are indicated as they do not require plugging in a value for the unobserved component. The odds ratio gives the mul-
tiplicative value for the odds if the explanatory variable increases by one unit. t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are
bootstrapped with 1,000 replications. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.010. Other than listed explanatory variables are previ-
ously mentioned.
Abbreviations: Children le6 (le10, le15) means younger than 7 (11, 16) years old.
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP v33.1, 1985-2016.
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Thus, the following analysis will turn to the impact of the variables introduced above
on the transition from a discrepancy to a non-discrepancy state (Table 2.5).
Family characteristics
The impact of children on the resolution of working hour discrepancies provides
some interesting insights. In general, children impede the resolution of female work-
ing hour discrepancies, but especially underemployed mothers are concerned. Hence,
the findings do not support the hypothesis that an adjustment of preferences, i.e.,
settling, plays an important role for underemployed mothers. Children make the
resolution of hours constraints more likely for men, but the odds ratios are not sta-
tistically different from one. Thus, the coefficients act in the expected way for un-
deremployed fathers while the hypothesis cannot be supported for fathers with a
preference for an hour reduction.
Institutional constraints and interventions
Like for the creation of hour discrepancies we find that the expansion of child care
does not change the odds ratios of the child-related variables and hence, there is
on average no evidence for the effectiveness of the child care expansion in terms of
solving hour discrepancies. In contrast to the creation of hour discrepancies, also
the not interacted measure for child care lacks significance. However, we find that
housekeeping and for women also time spent on child care keep from solving a dis-
crepancy of both underemployment (0.924 and 0.963) and overemployment (0.882**
and 0.934*).6
Moreover, we do neither find evidence for an increase of the probability to resolve
overemployment nor for the persistence of underemployment after the legal claim
to work part-time came into force in firms with more than 15 employees.
Job characteristics
Concerning the job characteristics, the resolution is less likely for underemployed
in low prestige jobs and overemployed in high prestige jobs. These odds ratios also
turn out to statistically significantly differ between under- and overemployed. In
the former case a lack of flexibility and low negotiation power are plausible rea-
sons. Like for the creation of overemployment, peer pressure or delimited workload
might prove relevant for solving overemployment. Hence, these findings support
the proposed hypotheses.
6For better readability, these results are not shown in Table 2.5. See Appendix A, Table A.3 for
additional estimation results.
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Career stages
Continuing with the impact of the career stages, women have a higher probability
for quitting overemployment in earlier life stages than during the middle phase. Re-
capitulating that also the creation of overemployment was more likely during these
stages, women turn out to be more prone to switches into and out of overemploy-
ment in the early phases. This finding does not correspond to expectations that here,
the resolution of discrepancies is harder to be achieved. However, it demonstrates
that persistence of female overemployment is most problematic in the middle of the
working life. The pattern of the female underemployed is similar from the estab-
lishing stage onwards, but the odds ratios are smaller and not significant. Male un-
deremployed have a lower probability for solving their discrepancy during earlier
stages. Hence, underemployment represents a substantial problem for men in their
early career, with those affected facing severe constraints which supports expecta-
tions for this group. We furthermore find that overemployed men have difficulties
solving a discrepancy before retiring. This finding suggests the importance of flexi-
ble retiring schemes encouraging to decrease actual working hours.
Path dependence and adjustment margin
Like expected, multiple spells prevent constrained individuals from solving a dis-
crepancy. Interestingly, while the reemergence of a discrepancy is less likely, once an
additional spell occurs, it is hard to end. Furthermore, the longer the discrepancy has
already lasted, the more likely is its resolution supporting positive duration depen-
dence. The odds ratio is considerably stronger for under- than for overemployment.
Regarding the explanation, the further analysis seeks to discriminate between resig-
nation and increasing efforts to adjust actual working time.
In general, as for the creation of hour discrepancies, the adjustment of preferred
hours contributes more to the resolution of discrepancies (1.4 to 2.1 times as much).
About 28 up to 34 percent of the observations contains an adjustment of preferred
and/or actual hours, where for the resolution of discrepancies the number of changes
of actual hours is slightly higher compared to changes of preferred hours (except
for underemployed men). Also along the duration of the spell, descriptive findings
show that changes of preferences and actual working hours are similarly distributed.
By the same token, the odds ratios of interactions of the duration variable with the
binary indicators for a change of preferred and actual working hours do not statis-
tically significantly differ from each other in almost all cases.7 In conclusion, both
adjustment margins - resignation and increasing effort to solve discrepancies - mat-
ter for resolution.
7Only for the resolution of underemployment, the adjustment of actual hours tends to gain impor-
tance the longer the discrepancy has already lasted.
26 Chapter 2. Discrepancies between preferred and actual working hours
2.4.3 Robustness
As a robustness check logistic regressions that do not control for unobserved het-
erogeneity are estimated. Especially concerning the career stages and the children’s
age there are some differences to the fixed effects-logit estimates which hints at an
endogeneity problem for these variables. The differences of the variables consid-
ering the duration, period and spell, are the most striking. The logit estimates of
period (spell) turn out to be smaller (greater) than in the fixed effects-logit estima-
tion. Unlike to ordinary least squares estimation, the bias of logit estimates caused
by unobserved heterogeneity cannot only be explained by (i) the correlation of the
endogenous regressor with the residual and the correlation of the dependent vari-
able with the residual, but also by (ii) the residual’s variance (Mood, 2010). Even if
(i) can be neglected, the coefficient will be downward biased due to (ii). The resid-
ual may contain individual characteristics like having a strong tendency for being
constrained caused by health and satisfaction issues or workplace conditions (sort-
ing effect). Then this "discrepancy type" will have a positive correlation with the
creation of a discrepancy. Besides, it will be negatively correlated with period, i.e.,
the discrepancy occurs to an earlier point in time, and positively with spell, i.e., the
number of spells increases for "discrepancy types". Hence, the first part of the bias (i)
can be explained by an overall negative bias for the coefficient of period and an up-
ward bias for the coefficient of spell in case of logit estimation that does not account
for unobserved heterogeneity. An analogous argumentation holds for the resolu-
tion of a discrepancy. Thus, applying a logit estimation is not sufficient in the given
analysis. Furthermore, a Hausman test suggests preference for the fixed effects-logit
estimator as opposed to logit estimation for both creating and solving over- or un-
deremployment.
A second specification varies in the bandwidth of the discrepancy interval. Both a
smaller and larger discrepancy interval of 1.5 and 3.5 hours are tested and we find
no strong differences to the baseline estimation. The odds ratios of the underem-
ployed male subsamples turn out to differ the most which can result from limited
within variation and small sample size. Furthermore, a specification that drops left-
censored spells is tested which slightly changes the size of the odds ratios. The same
holds for dropping observations before the German reunification in 1990 and obser-
vations with very small or long durations between subsequent interviews.
Additionally, the daily hours spent on care for relatives (instrumented by its first
lag) is added as further regressor which is only available since 2001. Care duties are
both associated with the creation and resolution of female underemployment, i.e.,
the odds for a creation (resolution) are 1.2 (0.7) times higher (lower) for an increase
in care duties by one hour per day.
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2.5 Discussion and conclusion
This article contributes to the existing literature on working hour discrepancies in
examining the discrepancy of preferred and actual hours from a longitudinal ap-
proach, i.e., stressing how discrepancies emerge and resolve over time. Particularly,
the definition of career stages gives the analysis a life-course orientation that has
been predominantly neglected in the research of working hour discrepancies. Fur-
thermore, the data structure allows to observe individuals over a long time horizon
of 30 years, representing an advantage over existing studies that only conduct a two-
wave comparison.
Our main findings concern four different aspects. Firstly, we find that mothers
are differently affected by hour discrepancies in comparison with childless women.
Although children are linked to a lower probability for the creation of hours con-
straints, those mothers experiencing constraints are more likely to get stuck. This
finding especially holds for underemployed mothers of young children and sug-
gests that traditional role models still prevail. Apart from social norms, regulations
on the German tax and health insurance foster traditional employment patterns for
married couples. Policies that encourage an equal employment pattern as well as
increasing the supply of institutional child care can help avoiding and solving hour
discrepancies for currently employed mothers. Although the results cast doubt on
the effectiveness of the expansion of mainly part-time child care slots over the last
twenty years, Chapter 3 will show that the introduction of a legal claim for a child
care slot has a similar effect on preferred and agreed hours such that their discrep-
ancy is not affected. Moreover, our findings show that actual take up, i.e., the tran-
sition from full-time to part-time care is related to a higher probability for getting
underemployed.
Secondly, the job autonomy is one of the main determinants for becoming con-
strained and leaving this state. The creation and persistence of overemployment
are related to a higher job autonomy while the opposite pattern holds for under-
employment. Higher job autonomy is often linked with a steeper career path that
expects long working hours as signal of motivation and performance. On the con-
trary, low negotiation power and less flexibility in the context of long-term working
contracts is relevant for the development of underemployment. As, thirdly, the ca-
reer stages also contribute to the creation and resolution of hour discrepancies, the
findings suggest the importance of flexible working time arrangements not only for
certain job positions, but also in dependence from different life stages (compare Gie-
len, 2009). E.g., we find that overemployed men face severe constraints in reducing
actual working hours before retiring. Hence, this applies both to the amount of
hours, which is still often subject to a strict full-time part-time divide, and the tim-
ing that sets conditions for working hour preferences.
Fourthly, this article examines path dependence of working hour discrepancies and
finds that the creation of hours constraints exhibit positive duration dependence,
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but negative occurrence dependence. Thus, the results do not support the hypothe-
sis of individuals sorting into the state of having discrepancies. Moreover, we find
that the longer the constrained spell already lasts, the more likely individuals are to
leave this state. However, with an increasing number of previous discrepancy spells,
individuals are more likely to remain in under- or overemployment. These findings
highlight that individuals are in a constant flux of creating and solving working hour
discrepancies.
Reynolds and Aletraris (2006, 2010) additionally find out more about the adaption
of preferred and/or actual working hours. However, these studies do not take un-
observed heterogeneity into account that might especially occur if social norms are
important. Hence, the presented study benefits also from a full panel structure in
controlling for attitudes, norms and cohort effects that influence the working behav-
ior. To understand the creation and resolution of working hours constraints in detail,
future research may focus on how hour wishes and actual hours adjust over the life
course. The life course perspective is especially fruitful in the context of different as-
sumptions made by economists and sociologists on the adaption of preferences and
actual hours. Economic theory highlights the role of varying actual hours adapting
according to individual preferences while sociologists also emphasize the possibil-
ity of changing preferences. Additionally, knowledge on which of the adjustment
mechanisms prevails can give further advice for strengthening the employment po-
tential.
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Chapter 3
Early child care and the
employment potential of mothers:
Evidence from semi-parametric
difference-in-differences
estimation
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of an expansion of subsidized early child
care on maternal labor market outcomes. It contributes to the literature by analyz-
ing preferred working hours. Semi-parametric difference-in-differences estimation
based on survey data from the German Microcensus gives positive effects on the
employment rate, as well as on agreed and preferred working hours. As agreed and
preferred working hours adjust in line with each other, expansion of early child care
can tap labor market potentials beyond those of currently underemployed mothers.
Moreover, conditional effects show that especially better educated and cohabiting
mothers respond to the reform.
Keywords: early child care, maternal labor supply, semi-parametric difference-in-
differences, subsidized child care, working hour preferences
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3.1 Introduction
Employment rates and working hours in industrialized countries vary strongly across
gender for which the family background is often considered to be a main driving
force (OECD, 2017). While male careers are less life-course dependent, women more
often withdraw from the labor market or reduce their working hours after giving
birth to a child. Hence, policymakers advocate an expansion of publicly subsidized
child care in order to strengthen the employment potential in aging societies. In-
deed, the female employment rate turns out to be higher in countries such as the
Scandinavian states where child care is sufficiently provided. However, empirical
studies cannot unanimously support a positive causal relationship between subsi-
dized child care and female employment outcomes. I address this issue by evalu-
ating not only the effect of low-cost subsidized child care on the employment share
and agreed weekly working hours, but I further inform these debates by also exam-
ining underlying working hour preferences.
The article contributes to the existing literature in three different ways. Firstly, it
extends the analysis to working hour preferences and the mismatch between agreed
and preferred working hours. Working hour discrepancies are quite common in
industrialized countries as the previous chapter and other studies suggest (Drago
et al., 2005; Ehing, 2014; Fagan, 2001; Merz, 2002; Pollmann-Schult, 2009; Reynolds,
2003, 2004). Hence, evaluating if the availability of subsidized child care can affect
working hour discrepancies is important in ageing societies as fulfilling a prefer-
ence for more or less hours has positive effects on the employment potential and
on individual life, health or work measures (Ehing, 2014; Matiaske et al., 2017). I
use a rich data set from the German Microcensus which is a one percent represen-
tative sample of German households. The repeated cross-sections contain informa-
tion on the household composition and its economic and social background and the
data allows to examine over- and underemployment as well as individual work-
ing hour preferences. Furthermore, the focus is on early child care (children less
than three years old) on which there is less empirical evidence on compared to pre-
school institutions. Thirdly, instead of applying a linear OLS estimator, a two-stage
semi-parametric difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation procedure proposed by
Abadie (2005) is used such that the linear form assumption in the outcome equation
does not need to hold and common support between treated and control group can
be enforced. Moreover, the approach allows to infer heterogenous treatment effects.
There is a growing literature on evaluating the effectiveness of subsidized child
care not only on parental, mainly maternal outcomes (e.g., Andresen and Havnes,
2019; Bauernschuster and Schlotter, 2015; Cascio, 2009; Gelbach, 2002; Havnes and
Mogstad, 2011; Yamaguchi et al., 2018), but also on the child’s development (e.g., Du-
flo, 2001; Felfe et al., 2015; Felfe and Lalive, 2018) and fertility (Bauernschuster et al.,
2016). Many of these empirical studies rely on identification strategies that exploit
exogenous variation resulting from quasi-experiments. In line with these studies I
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use the expansion of subsidized child care in Germany, induced by the introduction
of a legal claim for a child care slot, to examine maternal employment.
I analyze the German labor market as an interesting example for the persistence of
traditional employment patterns. Although the female employment rate converges
to the male employment rate, there is strong variation when further conditioning on
motherhood for both the extensive and the intensive margin. In 2011, almost one
half of the childless couples both worked full-time while this was only the case for
22 percent of the couples with children (Wanger, 2015). In almost 20 percent of the
families, the mother is not employed and the father works full-time (14 percent for
childless couples). The majority of parents is characterized by a full-time working
father while the mother holds a part-time position. About one quarter of part-time
working women states the care for children or for people in need of care to be the
reason for the employment status. Hence, the reform implemented in 2013 had a
high potential to increase female employment both in terms of the extensive and in-
tensive margin. Especially involuntarily underemployed mothers might have raised
agreed hours.
In 2008, the German government formulated a law for the expansion of subsidized
child care for children aged one to three (Kinderförderungsgesetz KiföG) culminating
in a legal claim for a child care slot from August 2013 onwards. I use the exoge-
nous variation of the expansion of subsidized child care induced by the reform to
compare districts in which the coverage rate increased significantly (the treated or
high-intensity group) with those for which the coverage rate changed only by a small
amount (the control or low-intensity group). To be more concrete, I follow the ap-
proach of Bauernschuster et al. (2016), Felfe et al. (2015) and Havnes and Mogstad
(2011) who exploit spatial variation of German districts, Spanish states and Norwe-
gian districts respectively for which the child care coverage expanded differently
after the legal framework had changed. The authors define control and treatment
group by dividing the observational units at the median of the percentage point
change in the coverage rate. Thus, the DiD strategy compares labor market out-
comes of mothers with children aged up to three years in treated districts with those
where child care increases to a lesser extent before and after the legal claim came
into force.
The resulting intention-to-treat estimates give a positive impact both on the exten-
sive and intensive margin. Mothers of up to three-year-olds in districts with a large
increase of the child care coverage rate have a 5.7 percentage points higher employ-
ment rate after the reform than their counterparts in districts with a lower expansion
of subsidized child care. Agreed and preferred working hours are on average about
five hours per week higher and change similarly such that their mismatch is not
affected. The results are robust to several sensitivity checks. Especially the com-
mon trend for treated and control group in the absence of the reform seems to hold.
I furthermore show that the estimates are higher for better educated mothers and
that the adjustment mechanism of agreed and preferred working hours differs for
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cohabiting mothers.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section gives an overview on previous
empirical studies and describes theoretical considerations. Section 3.3 explains the
institutional background of the German child care system including its reform and
how it is exploited for the estimation strategy. Furthermore, the data is presented.
The estimation results can be found in Section 3.4. The last section concludes.
3.2 Child care availability and maternal employment
3.2.1 Related empirical findings
Estimating the causal effect of publicly financed child care on employment outcomes
suffers from several difficulties. One is that its price and the availability of infor-
mal child care provided by the family are often insufficiently observed (Havnes and
Mogstad, 2011). Another problem is the endogeneity of child care availability and
costs to employment measures. Hence, most studies apply quasi-experimental de-
signs that benefit from exogenous variation induced by a policy reform or an instru-
mental variable (for a review see Morrissey, 2017). However, the empirical results
strongly differ between countries depending on the economic conditions before the
reform was implemented, the population under consideration and the organization
of child care including private, public and informal arrangements. The bandwidth of
the effect of more generous child care varies from positive (Andresen and Havnes,
2019; Baker et al., 2008; Bauernschuster and Schlotter, 2015; Berlinski and Galiani,
2007; Berlinski et al., 2011; Fendel and Jochimsen, 2017; Fitzpatrick, 2012; Gelbach,
2002; Geyer et al., 2015; Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008; Nollenberger and Rodríguez-
Planas, 2011; Schlosser, 2005; Yamaguchi et al., 2018) to negligibly small or insignifi-
cant coefficients (Bettendorf et al., 2015; Cascio, 2009; Givord and Marbot, 2015; Goux
and Maurin, 2010; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011; Lundin et al., 2008).
Gelbach (2002) uses an instrumental variable approach to estimate the effect of pub-
lic school enrollment by exploiting quarter of birth regulations for the US. He esti-
mates a positive effect on the employment rate and on weekly hours for single moth-
ers while the coefficient is slightly smaller for married women. Fitzpatrick (2012)
finds only a positive effect for single mothers in the US with a regression discontinu-
ity (RD) design that is as well characterized by a child’s eligibility to kindergarten.
Berlinski et al. (2011) apply a RD design for Argentina where kindergarten enroll-
ment is defined by a cut-off date. Women whose youngest child attends kinder-
garten have a higher employment probability, also in full-time, and weekly hours
rise on average by 7.8.
The majority of empirical studies uses quasi-experiments for a DiD design. Schlosser
(2005) evaluates a reform that affected Arab mothers of children aged three to four
in Israel. She finds that free public preschool increased maternal employment by 8.1
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percentage points and average weekly hours by 2.8. Berlinski and Galiani (2007) es-
timate positive employment effects for Argentinean mothers of children aged three
to five. The authors exploit a preschool construction program taking place in the mid
1990s. The staggered introduction of subsidized child care in the Canadian province
Quebec was found to increase female employment by 7.7 percentage points (Baker
et al., 2008) which is in line with Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) who evaluate the
same reform and also find a positive effect on working hours. Positive effects can
also be found for Spain (Nollenberger and Rodríguez-Planas, 2011) and Germany
(Bauernschuster and Schlotter, 2015; Fendel and Jochimsen, 2017; Geyer et al., 2015).
Bauernschuster and Schlotter (2015) show that the transition to kindergarten defined
by cut-off rules is related to an increase in labor force participation by 36.6 percent-
age points and in average weekly hours by 14.3, i.e., by 23.2 percent. Fendel and
Jochimsen (2017) find positive short-term effects on the maternal labor force partic-
ipation for the child care reform of August 2013 including the legal claim for child
care and the introduction of home care allowances. With a microsimulation study
Geyer et al. (2015) demonstrate that universal child care has large, positive effects
for children older than one year. Other studies evaluating labor market responses
of mothers with children younger than three years old result in positive effects for
cohabiting mothers characterized by a shift to full-time employment (Andresen and
Havnes, 2019: for Norway).
In contrast, Lundin et al. (2008), Givord and Marbot (2015) and Havnes and Mogstad
(2011) find estimates for maternal (full-time) employment in Sweden, France and
Norway that are close to zero. The latter article evaluates the expansion of child
care availability for three to six year old children and suggests that public child care
mainly crowded out informal arrangements.
Referring to this, ambiguous findings from preliminary empirical work might also
stem from the ignorance of underlying preferences. Lundin et al. (2008) and Givord
and Marbot (2015) might have find no effects in the context of an already high share
of working mothers whose preferred and agreed working hours potentially match.
Countries with lower maternal employment which show positive responses to the
availability of subsidized child care could be those with a higher share of under-
employed women adjusting agreed to preferred working hours. In line with these
considerations several authors emphasize the role of adjusting preferences in case of
occuring life events like the birth of a child (Campbell and van Wanrooy, 2013; Drago
et al., 2005; Reynolds and Johnson, 2012). Reynolds and Johnson (2012) evaluate how
the number of children living in the household affects preferred and actual working
hours for the US and find that the birth of the first child is related to a larger drop
of female working hour preferences compared to actual working hours. The im-
pact on male working hours does not statistically significantly differ from zero. This
finding is in line with Drago et al. (2005) who evaluate working hour preferences
for Australian employees and conclude that women are more sensitive to changing
life conditions than men. Chapter 2 examines the mismatch dynamics considering
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household and job characteristics and finds suggestive evidence that the lack of in-
stitutional care arrangements may foster the creation of working hour discrepancies.
However, the mentioned studies do not examine the direct effect of subsidizing child
care on maternal working hours or neglect the adjustment mechanism (agreed ver-
sus preferred working hours).
Before turning to the empirical analysis, the next section is dedicated to a theoret-
ical discourse how preferred working hours may be affected by the expansion of
institutional child care.
3.2.2 Theoretical considerations
The examined reform mainly focused on the availability instead of the affordability
of child care (Kreyenfeld and Hank, 2000) which in turn can be considered as an
implicit subsidy (Berlinski and Galiani, 2007). The legal claim introduced in August
2013 guaranteed parents at least part-time care (four hours per day). Neoclassical
economic and sociological theories predict an increase for female labor force par-
ticipation whenever child care costs decrease. However, the effect on the intensive
margin remains ambiguous and represents a weighted average of the substitution
and income effect (Gelbach, 2002). Moreover, the overall effect is determined by the
degree to which public care crowds out other care arrangements. Previous studies
show that the impact on the extensive margin is negligible if women substitute in-
formal or private with institutional, subsidized arrangements (Havnes and Mogstad,
2011; Yamaguchi et al., 2018) or the female labor market participation is already high
(Givord and Marbot, 2015; Lundin et al., 2008).
Furthermore, sociological theory predicts that family policies encouraging female
employment shape social norms (Gangl and Ziefle, 2015; Zoch and Hondralis, 2017).
Hence, working mothers feel more accepted if they use institutional care resulting in
an increase of female employment. The availability of subsidized child care can have
different effects on preferred and actual working hours. Neoclassical theory assumes
perfect labor markets on which the absence of frictions equalizes working hour pref-
erences and actual hours. However, a mismatch can occur whenever social or occu-
pational constraints prevent employees from supplying the preferred hours (Drago
et al., 2005; Ehing, 2014; Fagan, 2001; Merz, 2002; Pollmann-Schult, 2009; Reynolds,
2003, 2004). The availability of child care has the potential to decrease this discrep-
ancy while the adjustment of preferred and/or agreed hours depends on the state of
being under-, overemployed or unconstrained before the reform came into effect.
Before further going into detail, the concept of working hour preferences has to be
explained. In general, the formulation of the survey question on preferred work-
ing hours differentiates between two concepts of hours constraints. Although most
surveys on working hour preferences consider earnings adjustments, one has to dis-
tinguish if respondents are free to indicate their preferences or if they take other
constraints like the care for children into account. Campbell and van Wanrooy (2013)
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suggest for further clarification that closed-ended questions on working hour pref-
erences can be followed up by questions on the feasibility of preferences or on the
constraints preventing from adjusting to the respondent’s preferences. These are ex-
actly the kind of questions the German Microcensus used in this article adds to the
indication on working hour preferences. Thus, respondents indicating the wish for
a change of working hour preferences are likely to freely choose the amount of pre-
ferred working hours and give information on the feasibility and potential external
constraints in other related survey questions. In reference to the research question
of this article, mothers with preference for supplying more working hours, but who
are restricted by the lack of external child care offers, are not supposed to internalize
the child care constraint when stating their desired working hours.
In this regard, underemployed women are expected to adjust their agreed hours to
their preferred amount as the availability of subsidized child care lowers time and
monetary constraints. Furthermore, institutional child care can attenuate interrole
conflicts between family and occupational requirements (Greenhaus and Beutell,
1985). Hence, overemployed mothers are supposed to adjust a working hour mis-
match by an increase in preferred hours. Finally, if unconstrained women adjust
their agreed hours due to the availability of subsidized child care, the change should
go in line with an adjustment of their preferences. Due to the repeated cross-sections,
the analysis does not allow to examine the individual adjustment of working hours
and cannot directly test the proposed mechanisms. However, mean changes of pre-
ferred and agreed working hours hint at distributional shifts that can reveal more
on adjusting underlying preferences when combined with findings on changes of
the share of unconstrained or under- and overemployed mothers. Given that moth-
ers are constrained due to an insufficient supply of external child care, the reform can
theoretically lead to the following four scenarios. Firstly, only average agreed work-
ing hours rise which should show up in a lower share of underemployed mothers.
Secondly, only the effect on average working hour preferences is positive. Then the
amount of overemployed women is expected to fall. Thirdly, if both average agreed
and preferred hours increase, either the share of under- and overemployed should
fall or there may be no shift as the hour increase is driven by at least one of the
groups. Fourthly, if neither preferred nor agreed working hours on average change,
the group size of unconstrained or under- and overemployed mothers should re-
main stable.
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TABLE 3.1: Child care institutions by providers
in Germany
Total of which
Profit (%) Non-profit (%)
organization organization
2010 1,386 164 (11.83) 1,013 (73.09)
2011 1,486 184 (12.38) 1,061 (71.40)
2012 1,631 181 (11.10) 1,185 (72.65)
2013 1,725 185 (10.72) 1,219 (70.67)
2014 1,962 230 (11.72) 1,289 (65.70)
2015 2,029 261 (12.86) 1,348 (66.44)
Notes: Remaining institutions have a public background.
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2010b, 2011c, 2012c, 2013b,
2014c, 2015c). Cut-off date is March 1st.
3.3 Institutional background, estimation strategy, data and
descriptive findings
3.3.1 Institutional background and estimation strategy
Institutional background
The German system of child care has several particularities ranging from strong re-
gional variation to the different providers of child care (Kreyenfeld and Hank, 2000).
Spatial differences are not only defined between urban and rural areas, but also be-
tween the former GDR and the West German states. Still in 2016, child care coverage
amounts to 51.8 percent in East Germany in comparison with 28.1 percent in West
Germany (Federal Statistical Office, 2016). Child care is usually provided by the
communities of which there are more than 11,000 resulting in huge differences not
only considering the price but also the availability of child care. A private market
is not well-developed as quality regulations and hence market entry are related to
high costs. The share of private institutions with a pure profit background amounts
to about 11 to 13 percent over the last years (compare Table 3.1). However, there is a
variety of non-profit organizations, often with a religious background, that receive
public subsidies. About two thirds of all institutions belong to this category.
The expansion of early child care
The expansion of early child care started in 2005 when the German government de-
cided on supplying 230,000 additional child care slots by 2010 (Tagesbetreuungsaus-
baugesetz). Two years later the objective was reinforced by targeting a coverage rate
of 35 percent by 2013 (Krippengipfel). In 2008, the government decided on a legal
claim for a child care slot for children aged one to three years from August 2013 on-
wards embedded in a law supporting the child’s development (KiFöG).1 In line with
1The KiFöG came in force in December 2008. Five years later, from August 2013 onwards, the legal
claim guaranteed child care provided by a facility or childminder for children aged one to three (§24
SGB VIII). Children younger than one year are also eligible if their parents are employed.
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the legal claim for a kindergarten slot introduced in 1996 (children older than two
years) the law focuses firstly on the child’s education and not on parental employ-
ment. The supply of child care is organized on the community level and subsidized
by the federal state. Moreover, the federation supports the child care expansion fi-
nancially. Until 2014, the federation has spent 5.4 billion Euro for improving child
care supply and engaged for annual 845 million Euro beginning in 2015 (BMFSFJ,
2015). The allocation of child care on the community level results in strong regional
variation that is strengthened by huge disparities between West and East German
federal states. In the former German Democratic Republic the education of children
was considered to be a public issue translating in a high share of children institu-
tionally cared for until today. In 2011, the coverage rate of children aged up to three
years old in subsidized care amounted to 49 percent in East Germany compared to
only 20 percent in the rest of the country (Federal Statistical Office, 2011b). The re-
form changed the availability of child care slots dramatically. In 2015, 28.2 percent
of children living in West-Germany and 51.9 percent in East Germany were in sub-
sidized care (Federal Statistical Office, 2015b).
Although the legal claim was announced five years before it came into force, a short-
age of 80,000 to 100,000 slots was predicted in July 2013 for the next month which
suggests an almost full take up ratio. In general, the provision of early child care ori-
ents on the existing supply of child care slots and not on the actual needs (Kreyenfeld
and Hank, 2000; BMFSFJ, 2015). While communities take population growth for the
planning process into account, authorities mainly neglect any other factors deter-
mining the demand for child care. Table 3.2 shows the take up ratio of child care for
several federal states for which official statistics are available. By March 1st, 2013,
take up ratios are close to unity in most states. After the introduction of the legal
claim in 2014, the ratio gets less tight indicating that the scarcity of child care slots
is less severe. Note however, that regional variation on the community level is still
high and that in many agglomerated areas child care slots continue being undersup-
plied.
Home care allowances (HCA)
The reforms of August 2013 included also the introduction of home care allowances
(HCA) that were available for children between 15 and 36 months old born after Au-
gust 2012 and who are not using subsidized child care. Younger children were also
eligible if parental leave benefits had exhausted. The subsidy amounted to monthly
100 Euro (150 Euro per month from August 2014 onwards) irrespective of the par-
ents’ employment status or income. However an upper bound was set to an annual
income of more than 500,000 Euro (married) or 250,000 Euro (singles). Opponents
of the allowances feared that they would reinforce traditional employment patterns
among couples as they encouraged families to not use subsidized child care. In July
2015, the home care allowances were declared unconstitutional while they normally
expired for children already receiving the subsidy.
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TABLE 3.2: Take up ratio of child care
Institution for children 2013 2014
aged ... years
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0-3 0.942 0.879
Bavaria 0-3 0.977 0.872
Hamburg all age groups 0.849 0.802
Hesse 0-3 0.939 0.840
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0-3 0.968 0.983
Lower Saxony 0-3 0.895 0.864
North Rhine-Westphalia 0-3 0.946 0.876
Saarland 0-3 0.930 0.882
Saxony-Anhalt all age groups 0.881 0.880
Notes: The take up rate is defined as actual take up divided by authorized slots.
Source: Own calculations based on the Statistical reports of the Statistical Offices of the
Federal States (Statistical Office of Baden-Wuerttemberg, 2013, 2014; Statistical Office of
Bavaria, 2013, 2014; Statistical Office of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, 2013, 2014;
Statistical Office of Hesse, 2013, 2014; Statistical Office of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
2013, 2014; Statistical Office of Lower Saxony, 2013, 2014; Statistical Office of North
Rhine-Westphalia, 2013, 2014; Statistical Office of Saarland, 2013, 2014; Statistical Office
of Saxony-Anhalt, 2013, 2014). Cut-off date is March 1st.
Although the receipt of these allowances is connected to not using subsidized child
care, eligibility criteria for the HCA and subsidized care are not fully opposed to each
other. Hence, children could be eligible for child care but not for the allowances in
case parental benefits are not completely made use of, i.e., twelve up to 14 months
after birth. Furthermore, there is also a small amount (8.4 percent) of eligible fam-
ilies neither requiring subsidies in form of the allowances nor in form of child care
possibly because they are unaware or not in need (Alt et al., 2015).
The estimation strategy does not allow to disentangle the reform effect into the im-
pact of the legal claim for a child care slot and the HCA. Theoretically, the allowances
are expected to counteract, as they increase the opportunity costs of using a pub-
lic child care slot and thus, mothers’ financial incentive to stay at home is higher.
Hence, the resulting estimates are expected to give a lower bound for the effect of
the expansion of subsidized child care. Moreover, there are two reasons why I ex-
pect negligible effects of the HCA on maternal employment such that the resulting
effects are more likely to be solely caused by the child care expansion. Firstly, Gath-
mann and Sass (2018) show that the introduction of similar HCA in the German
federal state Thuringia in 2006 has small and insignificant effects on maternal labor
supply. Secondly, the HCA are a potential confounder for the common trend as-
sumption between low- and high-intensity districts. In particular, the HCA violate
the assumption if they differently shift the potential employment trend. A possible
sensitivity analysis may include to test if the take up of these HCA differs between
low- and high-intensity districts. I find that the standardized mean difference2 of the
number of received public subsidies3 is very low. Hence, I argue that the HCA are
2The standardized mean difference is defined as the mean difference divided by the square root of
the average variance (see Rubin, 2001).
3The data does not contain information on the receipt of HCA. The number of received public
subsidies is the closest measure to the HCA.
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of minor importance as potential confounder.4
Methodological approach
The child care reform of 2013 serves as a quasi-experiment I exploit for DiD estima-
tion. Besides the temporal variation, the expansion of subsidized child care has a
spatial dimension that is used to define the treatment and control group. Follow-
ing the approach of Bauernschuster et al. (2016), Felfe et al. (2015) and Havnes and
Mogstad (2011), districts are split at the fourth and sixth percentile of the increase
in the child care coverage rate for children aged up to three years old. Hence, treat-
ment definition includes not a change from having no to having child care, but a
change from a lower to a higher coverage rate. Furthermore, the resulting effect is
an intention-to-treat effect as treatment definition does not inform about actual take
up of a child care slot. As from 2005 onwards the Microcensus does not provide
information on the attendance of a child care institution, it is not possible to relate
the resulting estimates to actual child care take up. However, the resulting estimates
clearly state the sign of the reform’s impact. One might additionally consider es-
timating the reform’s impact on the coverage rate itself. Any reference to such an
analysis on the district level is not meaningful as maternal employment is measured
on the individual level.
Alternatively, the implementation of the reform using a cut-off date would allow for
a regression discontinuity design. A major advantage of DiD estimation, however, is
the possibility to take seasonal effects into account which is especially relevant in the
given application. Early child care and kindergarten attendance often cannot start
at any point in time but orients on the beginning of the school year in August or
September. As older children have better chances for a child care slot, mothers with
children born shortly before the cut-off date are more likely to take up a job when the
school year starts. Empirical studies evaluating German family policies like parental
benefit reforms prefer DiD estimation for the same reason albeit the presence of a
cut-off date such that cohort effects can be ruled out (Cygan-Rehm, 2016; Cygan-
Rehm et al., 2018; Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014). Furthermore, comparing groups
only before and after the cut-off date would not allow for eliminating the impact
of the home care allowances for which solely mothers with children born later than
August 2012 are eligible. The treatment definition used in this article makes both
treated and control group eligible such that the overall effect may only contain the
effect of the child care expansion (see also the discussion in the previous section on
the home care allowances).
As the reform took place in August 2013, the pre-reform period is measured in 2011
to rule out any anticipation effects.5 Although the expansion of subsidized child
4The number of public subsidies slightly increase for both treated and control group over time. I do
not include it as a covariate in the propensity score as the approach of Abadie (2005) used in the article
does not allow to use time-variant covariates.
5The issue of anticipation is discussed as Assumption 2.
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FIGURE 3.1: Child care coverage rates (%) in control and treated dis-
tricts
Notes: The child care coverage rate measures the number of children up to three years old
in subsidized care in relation to all children in the respective birth cohort.
Source: Own calculations based on numbers from the Federal Statistical Office (2008, 2009,
2010a, 2011b, 2012b, 2013a, 2014b, 2015b).
care has started earlier, the largest increase in child care slots can be observed in the
year the legal claim came into force (BMFSFJ, 2015) which additionally supports the
use of the chosen survey years in contrast to previous years. From 2015 onwards the
increase of the child care coverage rate is significantly smaller. Hence, I set this year
as the post-reform period. The sensitivity analysis will provide similar results for
the year 2014 as post-reform period. The treatment group comprises mothers whose
youngest child is up to three years old and who live in a district in which the cover-
age rate increased by more than the sixth percentile (8.0 percentage points) between
2011 and 2015.6 Mothers of children up to three years old living in districts with a
lower increase of the coverage rate than the fourth percentile (6.5 percentage points)
within these years belong to the control group. Districts within this interval and
those undergoing a territorial reform within the considered time span are dropped
from the sample resulting in a sample size of 317 districts.7
Figure 3.1 shows how the child care coverage rates evolve in control and treated
districts. Although the share of institutionally cared for children is higher in low-
intensity districts, the lines are almost parallel until the reform has become effective
in 2013. From 2014 onwards the difference gets smaller for the first time.
The regional differences can be seen in Figure 3.2 which depicts descriptive statistics
of the child care coverage rates on the district level in 2011. It shows that child care
6Hence, the pre-(post-)reform period includes mothers with children born between February 2008
(2012) and December 2011 (2015).
7Figure B.1 in the Appendix depicts the distribution of the growth of the child care coverage rate
between 2011 and 2015. The identification of treatment and control group would be questionable in
case of intense concentration around the separation. I find that the distribution is similar to the normal
distribution and conclude that the identification strategy does not impose major problems.
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FIGURE 3.2: Child care coverage rates for under three-year-olds
across districts
Notes: The child care coverage rate measures the number
of children up to three years old in subsidized care in re-
lation to all children in the respective birth cohort.
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2011b). Cut-off date is
March 1st, 2011.
coverage rates are the highest in East Germany while the lowest can be found in the
southern and west-northern states.
Moreover, Table 3.3 indicates how the treated districts are spread over the federal
states. The majority of northern and western districts belong to the treated group for
which the coverage rate increased by more than 8.0 percentage points. In southern
states the distinction is less obvious while most districts in East Germany belong
to the control group for whom the coverage rate increased to a lesser extent. One
may be concerned that most districts of the former GDR belong to the control group.
However, a robustness check that drops East German districts will provide similar
results compared to the baseline estimates.
Average effects
The idea of the DiD estimator is to compare average outcomes of a group affected
by a reform with unaffected individuals before and after the treatment becomes ef-
fective. Under the assumptions of 1) parallel trends of control and treated group in
the absence of the reform, 2) the absence of anticipation effects and 3) the stable unit
treatment value assumption (SUTVA), the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATET) can be identified. The assumptions are discussed in the following.
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TABLE 3.3: Number of districts by group membership and federal
states
Federal state Control group Treatment group
West Germany:
Schleswig-Holstein 0 12
Hamburg 0 1
Lower Saxony 6 31
Bremen 0 1
North Rhine-Westphalia 1 47
Hesse 7 10
Rhineland-Palatinate 21 8
Baden-Wuerttemberg 20 11
Bavaria 50 25
Saarland 1 2
East Germany:
Berlin 1 0
Brandenburg 13 3
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2 0
Saxony 6 3
Saxony-Anhalt 14 0
Thuringia 17 4
Source: Own calculations based on numbers of the Federal Statistical Office (2011b,
2015b) from 317 districts.
Assumption 1: Parallel trends
Assumption 1) can be expressed as
E
[
Y0(1)|D = 1, X]−E [Y0(0)|D = 1, X]
=E
[
Y0(1)|D = 0, X]−E [Y0(0)|D = 0, X]
where Y0(t) denotes the potential outcome in the absence of the treatment at time
T = t where T = 0 is the pre-reform period and T = 1 the post-reform period. Y1(t)
is its counterpart under the reform. D is the binary treatment status and X depicts
some covariates. Controlling for a large set of covariates makes the assumption of
parallel trends more likely. I include covariates concerning the mother herself, the
household she lives in and also regional dummies to control for the economic back-
ground (compare Section 3.3.2). Beyond that, I will run a placebo test by postponing
the timing of the reform to 2011. While this kind of sensitivity analysis cannot di-
rectly test the common trend assumption, it may give suggestive evidence that it is
not violated.
Assumption 2: Absence of anticipation
As the reform was already announced in 2008, anticipation might be relevant in two
different forms. Mothers might have tried to postpone firstly, the date of concep-
tion or secondly, the date of birth to be eligible for the new regulations (births from
August 2012 onwards). Figure 3.3 depicts official birth numbers from the relevant
cohort 2012 in comparison with the cohort 2011 and does not show an irregular rise
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FIGURE 3.3: Monthly birth numbers
Source: Own representation with numbers from the Official birth registers of the
Federal Statistical Office (2011a, 2012a).
in August 2012. Hence, selection into treatment in the form of anticipation should
play a minor role. Additionally, I only use pre-reform observations from 2011 (po-
tential births between February 2008 and December 2011). This definition makes
it less plausible that mothers desiring to have a child try to postpone conception
longer than half a year such that the subsample of pre-reform mothers would have
been selective.
Assumption 3: SUTVA
As further assumption SUTVA rules out interactions between groups. The assump-
tion implies that individuals should not change between groups which might in
particular be relevant for families moving from a control district to a treated dis-
trict or vice versa. Due to the repeated cross sections, I cannot completely exclude
these individuals, but I can control for families having moved within the last twelve
months. The estimates would also be biased in case of other reforms taking place
during the observational period. A major reform on parental leave already came
into force in January 2007, incentivizing mothers to return to work at expiration
of parental benefits (Bergemann and Riphahn, 2010, 2015; Kluve and Tamm, 2013;
Kluve and Schmitz, 2018). However, the regulations were changed in July 2015 to
make part-time work during benefit receipt more attractive (ElterngeldPlus: see next
chapter). Findings suggest that dropping mothers of less than one-year-olds, who
are affected by the reform, will turn out to be robust compared to the baseline results.
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Under Assumptions 1) to 3) the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) is
identified as
ATET = E
[
Y1(1)−Y0(1)|D = 1
]
= E
[
E[Y1(1)−Y0(1)|D = 1, X]|D = 1
]
= E [E[Y(1)−Y(0)|D = 1, X]−E[Y(1)−Y(0)|D = 0, X]|D = 1]
which implies an outcome model that is usually estimated using OLS. Alternatively,
Abadie (2005) shows that the ATET is also identified as
ATET = E
[
P(D = 1|X)
P(D = 1)
ρ0Y
]
where
ρ0 =
T − λ
λ(1− λ)
D− P(D = 1|X)
P(D = 1|X)P(D = 0|X)
and λ being the share of post-treatment observations (see Abadie, 2005: for details).
This implies a two-step estimation procedure. In a first step the propensity score
P(D = 1|X) is estimated by logistic regression. The second step gives the weighted
non-parametric mean differences.
This approach has three main advantages. Firstly, it does not require a functional
form assumption in the second stage and allows for flexibility which is especially
useful for binary outcomes. Linear probability models usually used for paramet-
ric DiD estimation cannot satisfy the scale of such outcomes while nonlinear mod-
els based on the standard common trend assumption lead to inconsistent estimates
(Lechner, 2011). The second advantage concerns the common support between con-
trol and treatment group. If an observational unit does not have common support
within the other group, it can be dropped leading to higher comparability between
treated and control group - a feature that is usually neglected in outcome based mod-
els. Finally, the specific form of the estimator allows to infer heterogenous effects (to
be discussed in the next section).
Weighting temporal differences in the outcome is additionally relevant, as the reform
not only included the expansion of subsidized child care, but also the introduction of
home care allowances. Mothers applying for the allowances are supposed to be sim-
ilar in observed characteristics. Both treated and control group can apply for these
benefits and thus, if their outcome dynamics are the same in presence of the home
care allowances given their observed characteristics, the estimated effect only measures
the effect of the child care expansion. Therefore, I rely on defining treatment status
based on the increase in child care coverage instead of using mothers of older chil-
dren as control group (e.g., Bauernschuster and Schlotter, 2015). One might further-
more argue that control districts for which child care increased by a lower amount
are characterized by a larger increase in receipt of home care allowances. However,
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as already mentioned in Section 3.3.1, I find no systematic differences in the take up
of public subsidies between high- and low-intensity districts.
Heterogenous effects
To target particular groups, policymakers are often not only interested in average
effects for the whole population, but also in an policy’s impact for these groups.
Hence, previous studies estimate effects for specific subgroups (e.g., Cascio, 2009;
Havnes and Mogstad, 2011) - a procedure suffering from the multiple testing prob-
lem. The issue aggravates the more heterogeneities are investigated. Abadie (2005)
proposes a least squares approximation for the conditional effect
E
[
Y1(1)−Y0(1)|D = 1, Z
]
given by g(Z;γ) where ZeX:
γ0 = argminγeΓE
[
P(D = 1|X){ρ0Y− g(Z;γ)}2
]
.
γ0 directly indicates how the average effect varies over Z, and joint ordinary least
squares inference is given. To my knowledge, this is the first article providing an
application for estimating conditional effects following the proposition of Abadie
(2005).
3.3.2 Data and descriptive findings
The data is from the German Microcensus,8 a one percent representative sample of
German households. The repeated cross-sections conducted by the Federal Statisti-
cal Office contain annual information on the family background, employment and
other individual-specific characteristics. A main advantage of the Microcensus is the
detailed information on the family composition. Hence, a child’s and partner’s char-
acteristics can be connected with the observational unit of interest (mothers whose
youngest child is aged up to three years old). I restrict the sample to mothers who are
between 18 and 45 years old and who live in a private household which corresponds
to the main place of residence.
A further particularity of the Microcensus is the availability of individual working
hour preferences on top of agreed working hours. In contrast to other surveys like
the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) the question on working hours in the
Microcensus is filtered. This means that, before stating the amount of preferred
working hours, the individual is asked if he/she wants to increase or decrease the
agreed weekly working hours conditional on an earnings adjustment9 (for a method-
ological comparison of survey data on working hour preferences see Holst and
Bringmann, 2016). Thus, there is also a measure for under- (the wish for an increase
8For the baseline specification the analysis uses (Microcensus, 2011, 2015: on-site use).
9Information on the preference for an hour increase (decrease) is included since 2006 (2008).
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of agreed hours) and overemployment (the preference for less weekly hours). Apart
from an earnings adjustment, respondents are not supposed to internalize any cir-
cumstances preventing them from increasing agreed hours, as follow-up questions
explicitly ask for the main reason for not being able to work more hours within the
next two weeks. In contrast to the compulsory question on the wish for an hour
increase, respondents are free to answer their wish for an hour decrease. Holst and
Bringmann (2016) point out that the voluntary indication might imply the underrep-
resentation of overemployed. The analysis includes only respondents answering the
related questions, but I generally expect it to be a minor problem for the subsample
of young mothers.10
I link the Microcensus data with statistics on the regional child care coverage rate
for children aged up to three years old from the German Federal Statistical Office on
the district level (Federal Statistical Office, 2010a, 2011b, 2012b, 2013a, 2014b, 2015b).
The child care coverage rate is measured on the cut-off date March 1st and includes
children in subsidized care not additionally attending another care arrangement and
children in other care arrangements apart from subsidized care. The final sample in-
cludes 11,640 mothers (of which 3,505 are currently employed) of children not older
than three years.
The variables used for estimating the propensity score described in the previous
section and their descriptive statistics are listed in Table 3.4: family and individ-
ual characteristics, but also information on the interview. These numbers result af-
ter trimming observations, i.e., dropping individuals with a propensity score close
(< 0.05) to the minimum and maximum value (compare Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009). Trimming excludes 5,192 observations in the whole sample (N = 348 in the
control group, N = 4, 844 in the treated group) and 1,710 individuals of the em-
ployed sample (N = 230 in the control group, N = 1480 in the treated group).
A major threat to identification might stem from using repeated cross-sections in-
stead of panel data as individuals could have selected into employment after the
reform came effective. Hence, a balancing check looks at the covariate distribution
over time. Additional to mean values and standard deviations, Table 3.4 gives the
standardized mean difference defined as the mean difference over time divided by
the square root of the average variance (see Rubin, 2001). It does not exceed the criti-
cal value of 0.25 defined as large suggesting that selection over time depicts a minor
problem. The remaining columns show that differences between mothers in high-
and low-intensity districts are not large. Not surprisingly, only regional character-
istics diverge as treatment is defined upon German districts. Besides, note that the
analysis includes federal states instead of a dummy for East Germany to better take
regional differences into account.
Table 3.5 shows the means of the child care coverage rate and of the examined out-
come variables, their standard deviations and mean differences between treated and
10In the group of high-intensity districts only two percent indicate overemployment before the re-
form.
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TABLE 3.5: Mean outcomes and coverage rate by group membership
Treated group before refom Difference in means
Treated-control group
Variable Mean sd N Before After
Coverage rate % 20.16 (8.24) 158 -10.74*** -5.02***
Employed of which: 0.348 (0.476) 2,721 -0.042*** -0.009
Agreed hours 25.50 (13.66) 862 0.81 1.16**
Preferred hours 26.96 (13.71) 862 0.95 1.00*
Mismatch 1.46 (6.34) 862 0.14 -0.16
Full-time 0.348 (0.477) 862 0.006 0.011
Part-time 0.470 (0.499) 862 0.021 0.042*
Notes: The sample includes 18 to 45 years old mothers of up to three-year-olds. Agreed and
preferred hours are measured on the weekly basis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the German Microcensus and the Federal Statisti-
cal Office (2011b, 2015b).
control group before and after the reform. The average coverage rate shows that
less than one quarter of children in high-intensity districts are in subsidized care
before the reform came into force. More mothers in low-intensity districts use subsi-
dized care before the reform (negative, statistically significant difference), but high-
intensity districts catch up.11
As outcomes I examine the extensive and intensive margin, i.e., a dummy for em-
ployment, agreed and preferred working hours as well as their mismatch and a bi-
nary indicator for working full-time (more than 30 hours per week) or part-time
(between 12 and up to 30 hours per week). The Federal Statistical Office measures
employment according to the concept of the International Labour Organization (em-
ployment for at least one paid hour or self-employment in the week before the inter-
view) which includes employees in maternity protection and parental leave. Hence,
I rely on the concept of realized employment and exclude them. About one third
of all mothers in high-intensity districts are currently employed with an average of
25.5 hours per week. They prefer to slightly work more, on average one hour per
week. However, for the majority working hour preferences and agreed hours match
(13.8 percent of treated mothers are underemployed and only two percent overem-
ployed). About 35 percent of them hold a full-time position and almost one half
works in part-time. The last two columns of Table 3.5 give the differences in means
between treated and control group before and after the reform. Before the reform
employment rates in high- and low-intensity districts differ significantly, but the
difference vanishes after the reform. Concerning the intensive margin, one cannot
detect any strong variation across groups and time for all measures. Only part-time
jobs seem to have increased in high-intensity districts. Hence, descriptive findings
suggest a positive link between the expansion of subsidized child care and the em-
ployment rate, but no or only a weak relation to the intensive margin.
11Note that these are aggregated numbers that cannot give information on actual take up of a child
care slot on the individual level.
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3.4 Estimation results
3.4.1 Main results
Table 3.6 shows the baseline estimation results for the whole sample and different
sensitivity checks. Bootstrapped standard errors take the two-step nature of the pro-
cedure and clusters on the district level into account.
In general, districts with a large increase of the coverage rate experience a rise of
both the employment rate and working hours compared to districts with a lower
expansion of child care. The reform effect amounts to an increase of the employment
rate of 5.7 percentage points. Agreed and preferred weekly hours increase by 5.1 and
5.3 (20 percent of the pre-reform mean) respectively. Interestingly, these findings
suggest an almost equal adjustment of agreed and preferred hours such that the
effect on the mismatch size is close to zero. Further estimation results shown in
Table A.4 in the appendix demonstrate that the share of under- and overemployed
mothers is not significantly affected. These findings imply that the effects on hours
are not only driven by involuntarily underemployed mothers who adjust agreed
to preferred working hours, but that both distributions change. They suggest (see
Figures B.2 and B.3 of agreed and preferred working hours in the appendix) a shift
from marginal employment (categorized as up to 12 hours per week) to part-time
work (between 12 and up to 30 hours per week). One can also observe a decrease at
the upper part of the hour distribution. However, it contributes less to the average
effect due to a similar movement in the group of low-intensity districts. Hence, the
overall positive effect on working hours is driven by a shift from marginal to part-
time employment which also shows up in an unaffected share of full-time employed.
The remaining panels of Table 3.6 contain different robustness checks. Firstly, to
investigate the common trend assumption I check whether the time trend before the
reform is the same for districts with a high and smaller increase of the coverage rate.
I test a specification by introducing a placebo reform with the pre-reform period
being 2010 (T = 0) and the post-reform period 2011 (T = 1). The estimates are close
to zero (Panel D). Hence, shortly before the reform treated and control group show
a similar time trend.
The next specification (Panel B) uses the median of the increase of the coverage rate
for redefining the treatment and control group. The effects are similar to the results
in the main specification with the clearer cut. The same holds for changing the post
reform year to 2014. While similar in size, the effects for the intensive margin are
close to significance on conventional levels.
Other checks deviate from the baseline by changing the sample composition (Panel
C). The reform demonstrates to have a similar, but stronger effect when using only
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TABLE 3.6: Results of main estimation and sensitivity analysis - Average effects
Employ- Agreed Preferred Mismatch Full Part
ment hours hours (hours) time time
Panel A: Baseline
0.057** 5.089** 5.303** 0.213 0.063 0.126**
(0.028) (2.382) (2.580) (0.790) (0.048) (0.063)
N 11,640 3,505 3,505 3,505 3,505 3,505
Panel B: Sample composition
Median 0.069*** 3.823** 4.130** 0.307 0.027 0.119**
division (0.023) (1.929) (2.006) (0.403) (0.037) (0.050)
N 16,203 5,113 5,113 5,113 5,113 5,113
post = 2014 0.057** 3.263 3.360 0.097 0.037 0.090
(0.025) (2.179) (2.247) (0.380) (0.044) (0.055)
N 15,919 5,142 5,142 5,142 5,142 5,142
Panel C: Sample composition
West 0.066* 5.316* 6.562** 1.246 0.025 0.184**
Germany (0.038) (3.027) (3.268) (0.865) (0.058) (0.080)
N 10,618 3,196 3,196 3,196 3,196 3,196
Without under 0.110*** 6.621*** 6.087** -0.534 0.097* 0.142**
1-year-olds (0.039) (2.460) (2.564) (0.647) (0.051) (0.068)
N 7,695 3,001 3,001 3,001 3,001 3,001
Without 0.052* 4.503* 4.687* 0.184 0.058 0.111*
childminders (0.029) (2.491) (2.700) (0.767) (0.051) (0.065)
N 11,438 3,441 3,441 3,441 3,441 3,441
Without families 0.066** 5.401** 6.186** 0.785 0.054 0.163**
having moved (0.030) (2.521) (2.743) (0.791) (0.053) (0.068)
N 10,330 3,177 3,177 3,177 3,177 3,177
Panel D: Common trend
Placebo -0.007 -0.687 0.127 0.814 -0.031 0.008
reform (0.032) (2.417) (2.006) (0.605) (0.048) (0.067)
N 11,307 3,638 3,638 3,638 3,638 3,638
Notes: Standard errors (in columns) are bootstrapped with 1,000 replications considering clusters on the
district level. The sample includes 18 to 45 years old mothers of up to three-year-olds. Agreed and preferred
hours are measured on the weekly basis. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the German Microcensus and the Federal Statistical Office
(2011b, 2015b).
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TABLE 3.7: Results of heterogeneity analysis - Effect variation
Employ- Agreed Preferred Mismatch Full Part
ment hours hours (hours) time time
Heterogeneities
Education (Reference: Lower secondary school)
Middle secondary school 0.044 6.216 5.600 -0.616 0.161 -0.113
(0.063) (6.250) (6.881) (1.904) (0.139) (0.154)
High school 0.122* 10.457* 9.773 -0.684 0.182 0.116
(0.069) (6.051) (6.673) (1.979) (0.130) (0.159)
Number of children -0.004 1.462 2.550 1.087 0.014 0.055
(0.025) (2.629) (2.912) (1.059) (0.053) (0.074)
Partner (Reference: No partner living in household)
Partner living in household 0.052 2.641 -0.454 -3.095* 0.027 0.104
(0.073) (6.840) (7.343) (1.834 (0.140) (0.160)
N 11,640 3,505 3,505 3,505 3,505 3,505
Notes: Standard errors (in columns) are bootstrapped with 1,000 replications considering clusters on the district level.
The sample includes 18 to 45 years old mothers of up to three-year-olds. Agreed and preferred hours are measured
on the weekly basis. The estimates give the difference to the reference group for categorical variables or to a one-unit
increase in case of continuous variables. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the German Microcensus and the Federal Statistical Office (2011b, 2015b).
West German districts.12 Employment of mothers living in high-intensity West Ger-
man districts rises by 6.6 percentage points which is mainly driven by part-time em-
ployment. Interestingly, their preferred working hours increase slightly more com-
pared to agreed working hours. These findings show that the overall effect for both
East and West Germany turns out to be robust considering any systematic differ-
ences between districts of the former GDR and West German districts. Thus, includ-
ing East Germany in the baseline analysis is not problematic. Dropping mothers of
children younger than one year old leads to a slightly larger effect for all outcomes.
In particular, full-time employment is positively affected for mothers whose children
are older than one year. Moreover, the results show that the parental leave reform
of 2015 that affected mothers of less than one-year-olds is not supposed to drive the
results. As mothers working in a child care facility might be differently affected by
the reform, they are excluded in another specification which only slightly changes
the estimates. The same holds when checking for selective migration by excluding
those having changed their place of residence within the last twelve months.
3.4.2 Heterogenous effects
Table 3.7 indicates how the effects vary over different subgroups as estimated in
Abadie (2005). Note that the estimates give the difference to the reference group
for categorical variables or to a one-unit increase in case of continuous variables.
E.g., mothers with high school degree show a by twelve percentage points higher
employment effect compared to mothers with a degree from lower secondary school.
12To estimate the effect for the West German subsample the analysis defines treatment solely based
on the quantile increase of the coverage rate in these districts and does not include East Germany.
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The impact on the intensive margin is as well higher for better educated women,
but the estimates are characterized by a high variance. These findings are in line
with Havnes and Mogstad (2011) who also find larger effects for better educated
mothers. However, this difference is weaker pronounced as the general reform effect
also turns out to be smaller. One explanation of this result could be that external
child care costs continue to be too high for mothers with lower educational degree.
While the average effect does not vary for the number of children, further interesting
findings concern the presence of a partner. Although the estimates in general do not
support deviating adjustment mechanisms for agreed and preferred working hours,
cohabiting mothers show a significant higher rise of agreed hours. As the rate of
underemployment also decreases for this subgroup, the reform was especially suc-
cessful for families with a more traditional employment pattern by adapting agreed
hours to the desired level.
3.5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence for the causal effect of subsidizing early
child care on maternal labor market outcomes. It exploits the staggered expansion
of early child care provision in Germany culminating in a legal claim for a child care
slot introduced in 2013. The presented semi-parametrically estimated intention-to-
treat effects suggest a strong impact of 5.7 percentage points on the maternal em-
ployment rate and of five on agreed and preferred weekly working hours. Besides,
the share of full-time employed women does not significantly change in response
to the reform which might result from limited provision of full-time child care slots
or the parental preference for part-time care. Although the share of realized full-
time slots (defined as more than seven hours per day) almost doubled from 2011 to
2015 in high-intensity districts, only one out of ten children attends full-time care in
post-reform years. However, these numbers cannot definitely answer which of the
two channels, lack of provision or parental preferences, prevails as they do not give
information on the supply of full-time slots.
The main findings are in general in line with previous results for Germany. Bauern-
schuster and Schlotter (2015) estimate intention-to-treat effects for the eligibility to
kindergarten in the range of five to eight percentage points for employment and of
2.5 for weekly hours. Fendel and Jochimsen (2017) find an increase of maternal em-
ployment of eight percentage points for the overall reform, i.e., the legal claim for
a child care slot and the introduction of the home care allowances. Hence, these
findings for Germany turn out to be robust compared to other countries with low
maternal labor market participation (Baker et al., 2008; Berlinski and Galiani, 2007;
Berlinski et al., 2011; Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008; Nollenberger and Rodríguez-
Planas, 2011; Schlosser, 2005). Another crucial finding concerns the adjustment of
agreed and preferred working hours. Both measures change, but in contrast to
Reynolds and Johnson (2012) this article finds that agreed and preferred working
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hours adjust on average in line with each other. Furthermore, the average effect on
the share of under- and overemployed mothers is not significant. These results im-
ply that also the size of the mismatch remains close to zero and that the results are
not only driven by involuntarily underemployed mothers adjusting agreed to pre-
ferred working hours. On the contrary, the availability of low cost child care has the
potential to increase working hour preferences also for other groups represented in
an overall shift of the distributions of agreed and preferred working hours. Mothers
changing from marginal to part-time work characterize this shift.
Another contribution of this article is the provision of conditional average effects
with two interesting findings. Firstly, mothers with high school degree show large
positive responses in contrast to women with lower educational degree which can be
explained by too high external child care costs for the latter group. Hence, a possible
implication is to organize parental contributions for child care slots income-related
as many communities already have implemented. Secondly, cohabiting mothers
who might have previously provided additional earnings to a partner’s main in-
come show a higher adjustment of agreed than of preferred working hours which
is reflected in a lower share of underemployed. This finding extends the declara-
tions for ambiguous results in different countries and underlines the possibility for
deviating adjustments of preferred and agreed working hours. The effect size can
also depend on the degree to which mothers are not satisfied with their actual or
agreed working hours. Hence, underlying working hour preferences are relevant
to consider when assessing the potential success of a reform targeting female labor
supply. These results for cohabiting mothers are supported by a related study for
Norway. Andresen and Havnes (2019) find that especially cohabiting mothers re-
spond to child care attendance of two-year-olds by increasing full-time employment
in the context of the majority (63 percent) holding a part-time contract before the
reform.
Although the reform’s overall effect seem to be positive, questions remain. Espe-
cially the group of mothers with lower educational degree and singles show small
responses. Hence, further research might focus on the channels that drive these re-
sults.
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Chapter 4
Paid parental leave and maternal
reemployment: Do part-time
subsidies help or harm?
Joint with Michael Zimmertc
Abstract: Employment subsidies can incentivize mothers to shorten employment in-
terruptions after childbirth. We examine a German parental leave reform promoting
an early return to work in part-time. Exploiting the exogenous variation in the bene-
fit entitlement length defined by the child’s birthday, we apply machine-learning
augmented semi-parametric difference-in-difference estimation using administra-
tive data. The reform yields positive average employment effects mainly driven by
part-time employment as our dynamic optimization model for mothers on parental
leave suggests. Conditional effects show that the policy creates heterogenous incen-
tives depending on the opportunity costs of working part-time.
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4.1 Introduction
Motherhood and related employment interruptions are still one of the main causes
for the gender wage gap and different labor market prospects for women (Lundborg
et al., 2017). While gender roles converge and women catch up in terms of educa-
tion and job choice (Goldin, 2014), women face statistical discrimination even ex
ante in expectation of potential motherhood and its related costs to the firm (Jessen
et al., 2019). As long career breaks imply hiring and training costs for a new can-
didate, employers might anticipate motherhood in their recruiting process. Even if
young women find a suitable job, starting a family will fundamentally change their
choice set and potentially lead to a reduction of working time with the consequence
of worsened employment prospects and lower wage expectations (Goldin, 2014).
Hence, labor market interventions promoting an earlier return to employment may
be regarded as a suitable tool to cushion these adverse effects. In particular, this
article analyzes if subsidized part-time work after child birth shortens employment
breaks and affects the working time pattern of mothers sustainably.
There is a growing trend for extending the provision of paid parental leave over the
last years (compare Dahl et al., 2016). Especially European countries nowadays offer
generous parental leave regulations. In the United States, however, there is no na-
tionwide paid leave period despite some states notably California agreed on a paid
protection period (Rossin-Slater et al., 2013). In line with these trends, literature on
the effectiveness of maternity protection and (un)paid parental leave policies broad-
ens and analyses use the exogenous variation induced by reforms to investigate ma-
ternal labor market outcomes. While previous studies find that short unpaid protec-
tion periods like the Federal Maternal Legislation Act (FMLA) in the United States
have small effects on maternal employment and wages (Waldfogel, 1999; Baum,
2003), results differ for longer potential parental leave durations. Many authors
find that mothers delay their return to work for extended parental leave regulations
(Baker and Milligan, 2008; Bergemann and Riphahn, 2015; Dahl et al., 2016; Lalive
and Zweimüller, 2009; Kluve and Tamm, 2013; Kluve and Schmitz, 2018; Schönberg
and Ludsteck, 2014). Less is known about the employment outcomes, especially
working hours, after having been returned to work. This is especially important as
length and timing of working hours are considered to be the "last chapter" (Goldin,
2014) for reducing or even closing the gender wage gap. Long working hours signal
productivity and employees willing to work long hours are more likely to be pro-
moted (Landers et al., 1996). In this context the question arises if maternity leave
improves employment stability enabling mothers to return in less precarious jobs
with better career prospects. There exist two articles analyzing working hours after
mothers returned to work. Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014) show for Germany that
several extensions in paid leave coverage between 1979 and 1992 lead to short-term
reductions in full-time employment, but do not have any long-run effects. In con-
trast, Kluve and Schmitz (2018) find even long-lasting positive effects on full-time
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employment for mothers from the upper tercile of the income distribution which is
the group the most affected by a German parental leave reform in 2007. We also
examine Germany as a labor market on which the traditional division of paid and
unpaid household work predominates. While the German government enacted sev-
eral family reforms over the last decades encouraging external child care attendance
and a more equal division of unpaid household work, a strict full-time/part-time
division of father and mother persists (Wanger, 2015).
We contribute to the literature on the impact of maternal leave on employment in
at least three different fields: 1) content-related by focusing on the working time
pattern, i.e., the intensive employment margin, 2) theoretically by proposing an il-
lustrative dynamic optimization problem for employees on parental leave and 3)
methodologically by providing credible average and subgroup-specific effect esti-
mation using machine learning algorithms and high-quality administrative data.
In detail, we examine the effect of subsidizing part-time on the maternal working
time pattern right after the birth of a child. Mothers affected by a new law coming
into force for births from July 2015 onwards are encouraged to combine income from
part-time work and public subsidies. We develop a heuristic dynamic optimization
problem that depicts this mechanism. As part-time work becomes more attractive
relative to extending parental leave and to working full-time, the overall employ-
ment effects are unclear. Even if the effect on the extensive employment margin is
positive, the policy might foster the so-called part-time trap. In particular, employ-
ees might be unable to increase their agreed working hours to a full-time job at a
later point in time. These theoretical findings motivate to empirically assess the ef-
fects of an extended part-time subsidy.
The implementation of the reform enables to exploit exogenous variation in the en-
titlement length and benefit amount of parental leave affecting mothers with chil-
dren born later than June 2015. We compare those treated mothers with women
having children born shortly before the cut-off date. To account for seasonal effects
resulting from different patterns for the start of the school year we use difference-in-
differences estimation. As different factors such as local differences in the economy
or personal characteristics of women may differently shift the employment trends,
we include a large list of covariates from administrative data. In particular, we ap-
ply a recently proposed semi-parametric difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator
(Sant’Anna and Zhao, 2018; Zimmert, 2018). It allows to include covariates in a
data-driven way using state of the art machine learning algorithms. We argue that
the inclusion of a large set of covariates makes our identifying assumptions more
credible. Additionally, we avoid common problems in parametric DiD estimation
like arbitrary functional form assumptions and misspecification errors. Moreover,
as first shown in Abadie (2005), semi-parametric DiD estimation allows to infer het-
erogeneous effects that uncover for which subgroups the reform was effective. We
give an identification result that implies a new estimator for heterogeneous treat-
ment effects estimation in the DiD setting.
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Our results show that women exposed to the reform have on average an about two
percentage points higher probability to return to work within the first year which
amounts to about 14 percent of the pre-reform level. Like the reform intended, this
increase is mainly driven by part-time employment. However, these positive av-
erage effects do not continue after the child’s first birthday. Although limited to a
two-year perspective, these findings cast doubt upon sustainably strengthening fe-
male employment prospects. Besides, on average we cannot confirm the existence of
a part-time trap for this short time horizon. To some extent, the heterogenous effects
show a more refined pattern. Especially mothers with middle income are willing to
take up the new part-time subsidy. In turn, mothers with higher income expecta-
tions might fear future income losses in case they accept a lower-paid part-time job.
The article proceeds as follows. The next two sections describe the institutional set-
ting and the dynamic optimization problem. Section 4.4 and 4.5 explain the esti-
mation strategy and the exploited data before presenting the estimation results and
sensitivity checks in Section 4.6. The article ends with a discussion of the results and
a conclusion.
4.2 Institutional background
The German system of birth-related legal work interruptions distinguishes two dif-
ferent forms: maternity protection and parental leave. The first concept describes a
period of six weeks before and eight weeks after child birth in which mothers are
not allowed to work due to health risks. The latter wants to facilitate the employ-
ment continuity of parents and especially of mothers by defining a period up to
which parents have the right to return to their previous employer. Table 4.1 gives
an overview of the two most important parental leave (Elterngeld abbreviated EG)
regulations over the last years. This article will focus on the regulations for births
from July 2015 onwards (last column).
4.2.1 Regulations of parental benefits prior to the reform in 2015 (Eltern-
geld EG)
Former regulations (see second column in Table 4.1) for births from January 2007
onwards aimed at facilitating motherhood for working women and engaging fathers
in child care. It standardized the maximum benefit receipt duration to 12 months
with additional two months if both parents are on leave (so-called daddy months,
see Tamm (2019) for their evaluation). Besides, a replacement rate λ of 65 percent (up
to 100 percent for parents with low income) was introduced determining the basic
parental benefit amount based on the average net monthly income measured during
the twelve months before child birth denoted by y¯. Previously none-working or low-
income mothers receive a minimum of 300 Euro per month while the maximum was
set to 1800 Euro per month. Part-time work as a share β of a full-time contract and
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up to 30 hours per week is also possible, but reduces the benefit amount. For part-
time working mothers the difference between former and current net income (y¯− y)
serves as reference value for the replacement rate τ that also amounts to between 65
and 100 percent (for a graphical representation relating prior with current income
see Figure 4.1a):
ιEG =

= 300 ≤ λy¯ ≤ 1800 if not working, paid for 12 months
= 300 ≤ τ(y¯− βy) ≤ 1800 if part-time working, paid for 12 months
= 0 else
Kluve and Schmitz (2018) show that mothers with income from the upper tercile of
the distribution benefit the most from these parental leave regulations having posi-
tive effects on full-time employment up to the child’s fifth birthday. Moreover, Kluve
and Schmitz (2014, 2018) highlight the formation of a social norm to return to work
at the end of the maximum entitlement length of 12 months which is challenged by
the new regulations coming into force in July 2015.
4.2.2 The reform in July 2015 (ElterngeldPlus EG+)
The new regulations coming into effect for births from July 2015 onwards double the
maximum entitlement period to 24 months while receiving up to half of the basic
benefit amount (compare Figure 4.1b):
ιEG+ =

= 150 ≤ λy¯2 ≤ 900 if not working, paid for 24 months
= 150 ≤ min(τ(y¯− βy), λy¯2 ) ≤ 900 if part-time working, paid for 24 months
= 0 else
Table 4.2 gives several examples for the calculation of the subsidy under the new
regime. Besides, the model presented in Section 4.3 explains the reform mechanisms
in detail. The regulations for births until July 2015 discourage mothers to return to
work before parental benefits expire as current labor income is taken into account
for the calculation of the subsidy. Official statistics show that the majority of female
benefit recipients with children born in the third quarter 2015 chooses the full basic
amount (81 percent) with an average benefit amount of monthly 757 Euro and in total
8,797 Euro (Federal Statistical Office, 2019). The remaining 19 percent decided for the
second option (EG+) and received on average 492 Euro per month with a slightly
higher total sum of 9,130 Euro compared to EG. Parents can also share the parental
leave period. The two additional daddy months result in four extra months under
the new regime. Parents choosing this option are eligible for another four months
of benefit receipt resulting in 32 months all together. About ten percent of all male
benefit recipients decided to be on leave for at least four months in the relevant birth
cohort (Federal Statistical Office, 2019) which amounts to about three percent of all
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FIGURE 4.1: Payment schemes before and after cut-off date
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Notes: The pre-reform payment scheme is depicted by ιEG , the post-reform payment scheme by ιEG+. The graph
gives the benefit amount in dependence from prior and current income.
Source: Own diagram.
births in the third quarter of 2015. Hence, we expect only small effects on paternal
labor supply as a channel for maternal employment adjustments. Moreover, Tamm
(2019) find that the daddy months established by the previous reform in 2007 do not
significantly affect paternal involvement in child care and housework on weekdays
for those currently on leave.1 Hence, paternal leave can rather be considered as
shared family time than a promotion of maternal employment.
Unaffected by both reforms, the unpaid maximum parental leave duration amounts
to 36 months from child birth onwards, i.e., mothers have the right to return to their
previous employer until the child’s third birthday.
4.2.3 The expansion of subsidized child care
The lack of suitable child care slots may prevent mothers from returning to work.
Recent parental leave changes are part of different family policies notably the child
care expansion for under three-year-olds starting in 2005 and culminating in a legal
claim for a child care slot from August 2013 onwards (see Chapter 3). Before the
first parental leave reform in 2007, only 13.6 percent of children younger than three
years old attend subsidized child care (Federal Statistical Office, 2006) increasing to
32.9 percent in 2015 (Federal Statistical Office, 2015b). Although also under one-
year-olds have a claim for a child care slot if both parents are working, jobseeking or
in education,2 only 2.6 percent of this age group attend child care in 2015 (Federal
1In turn, Tamm (2019) and also Patnaik (2019) find that paternal leave can strengthen paternal in-
volvement in child care and housework in the longer term, i.e., beyond the leave duration. Unfortu-
nately, the data set does not allow to examine the policy from a comprehensive household context as
information on paternal employment and subsidy receipt are unknown.
2This regulation is defined by §24 SGB VIII.
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TABLE 4.2: Calculation of benefit amount Elterngeld and ElterngeldPlus
Example Net monthly income Income Parental benefit amount
before after difference not working working
birth birth
I 2,000 0 2,000 2, 000 ∗ 0.65 = 1, 300 -
EG 12 ∗ 1, 300 = 15, 600 12 ∗ 1, 300 = 15, 600
EG+ cap= 1, 300/2 = 650 24 ∗ 650 = 15, 600
II 2,000 1,200 800 2, 000 ∗ 0.65 = 1, 300 800 ∗ 0.77 = 616
EG 12 ∗ 1, 300 = 15, 600 12 ∗ 616 = 7, 392
EG+ cap= 1, 300/2 = 650 24 ∗ 616 = 14, 784
III 2,000 500 1,500 2, 000 ∗ 0.65 = 1300 1, 500 ∗ 0.65 = 975
EG 12 ∗ 1, 300 = 15, 600 12 ∗ 975 = 11, 700
EG+ cap= 1, 300/2 = 650 24 ∗ 650 = 15, 600
IV 2,000 2,000 0 2, 000 ∗ 0.65 = 1300 300
EG 12 ∗ 1, 300 = 15, 600 12 ∗ 300 = 3, 600
EG+ cap= 1, 300/2 = 650 24 ∗ 150 = 3, 600
Notes: Income in Euro. The table gives several examples for the calculation of the benefit amount under the new
regime. Mothers can optionally decide for the full basic benefit amount for a period of 12 months (EG) which amounts
to 1,300 Euro per month or 15,600 Euro in total in the example. The total sum is not affected if the mother decides
for half the amount (650 Euro per month) for the longer period of 24 months (15,600 Euro). However, if she has net
earnings of 1,200 Euro per month (Example II), she will only receive additional 616 Euro for up to 24 months which
is in total less than Example I. Under Example III with a monthly income of 500 Euro she can decide for 975 Euro for
one year (in total 11,700 Euro) or 650 Euro for two years (in total 15,600 Euro). In case she has an equal income than
before (Example IV) she will receive the minimum amount of 300 or 150 Euro respectively.
Source: Own representation based on BMFSFJ (2018).
Statistical Office, 2015b). These numbers tend to be higher in urban areas and in
East Germany (4.1 percent) as a legacy of the former GDR. As official statistics lack
information on the number of authorized child care slots, we exploit data from the
survey FiD (DIW Berlin/SOEP, 2014: wave 2013) to explore the reasons for the low
early child care coverage. Similar to official statistics, the survey provides a coverage
rate for under one-year-olds of 3.1 percent. It shows that 88 percent of parents not
making use of a child care slot consider their child to be too young while five percent
indicate the lack of suitable child care slots. Hence, we conclude that institutional
restrictions do not determine the low coverage rate but attitudes towards external
child care.
4.3 Theoretical effects of part-time subsidies
4.3.1 Model set up
For the sake of illustration we set up a dynamic optimization problem according to
the given institutional framework. Mothers in parental leave can generally choose
between three options: staying in parental leave (pl), working full-time ( f ) or work-
ing part-time (p). After the end of the maximum parental leave duration in period
T mothers can either return to the labour force in part-time or full-time or drop into
unemployment (u) where they receive a fixed benefit amount bu.3 We neglect the op-
tion that mothers have a legal claim to return to their previous employer according
3For simplification we do not distinguish between unemployment and non-employment.
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to contracted hours and wage until the child’s third birthday. However, the model
implies that if a mother wants to reduce her working time after child birth but stay
with her previous employer, she has to renegotiate her working contract. This kind
of simplification will not restrict the main model mechanisms.
Throughout our heuristic model we assume that a decision taken in any period de-
termines the rest of the working life, i.e., mothers choosing part-time will stay in
part-time. Even though this might be a strong simplification, it depicts at least partly
the German labor market as a legal claim to increase working hours to a full-time job
after having worked in part-time only became effective in 2019. We assume that a
mother can decline a full-time job offer to work part-time and take only β× 100 per-
cent of the income offered. Since parental leave may also only represent a relatively
small period compared to the following working life of young women, we approxi-
mate the value of unemployment, full- and part-time work by infinite series starting
in T + 1. In particular, let ρ denote the discount rate, y be the income from a full-
time job offer in a certain period and l the constant value of leisure when working
part-time. We then get the following value functions in T + 1
VuT+1 = b
u 1+ ρ
ρ
, V fT+1 = yT+1
1+ ρ
ρ
and
VpT+1 = βyT+1
1+ ρ
ρ
+ (1− β)l 1+ ρ
ρ
. (4.1)
During parental leave a mother gets compensation from two different sources.
1. In state pl a mother receives a fixed share λ of her previous labour market
income y¯ (full-time or part-time).
2. If a mother decides to work part-time, she receives a fixed share of the dif-
ference between her previous income and the income from part-time work
τ × (y¯− βyt)+ = max(0, τ × (y¯− βyt)).
The decision problem of the mother in parental leave is whether to stay out of the
labour force or to accept a part-time or full-time job offer, and it can be solved by
dynamic optimization. We report the main results in the following sections and give
model details in the Appendix C.
4.3.2 Reservation income
We define the income that makes the mother indifferent between working and not
working as the reservation income of the extensive margin y∗EXT for any time pe-
riod. Similarly, the reservation income of the intensive margin y∗INT is defined as
the income that makes the mother indifferent between working part-time and full-
time given that she has decided to work.
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For the stationary environment after the maximum parental leave duration begin-
ning in T + 1 we find the reservation income of the extensive margin
y∗EXTT+1 = y
∗EXT
T+2 = ... =
bu if yT+t > lbu
β − 1−ββ l if yT+t < l
(4.2)
where the mother decides to work full-time whenever yT+t > l and part-time when-
ever yT+t < l.4 Hence, in the stationary setting the reservation income at the inten-
sive margin is y∗INTT+t = l.
Moreover, we can explicitly solve for the value function VplT and iterating backwards
will give an explicit solution for every VplT−t in the model. In the non-stationary en-
vironment for any period t ≥ 0 the reservation income will decline compared to
the pre period until it reaches the stationary solution in T + 1 as given in (4.2). We
therefore derive an implicit solution for the reservation income in the non-stationary
environment. In particular, we obtain
y∗EXTT−t =

ρ
1+ρV
pl
T−t if y >
y¯
β and y > l
1
β
(
ρ
1+ρV
pl
T−t − (1− β)l
)
if y > y¯β and y < l
ρ
1+ρV
pl
T−t if y <
y¯
β and
y > l + 11−βD(ρ, t)τ(y¯− βy)
1
β(1−τD(ρ,t))∗ if y < y¯β and(
ρ
1+ρV
pl
T−t − (1− β)l − D(ρ, t)τy¯
)
y < l + 11−βD(ρ, t)τ(y¯− βy)
(4.3)
with D(ρ, t) = 1−
(
1
1+ρ
)t+1
. The first two cases of (4.3) describe the situation when
the mother is not eligible to the part-time subsidy because the offered income is
much higher than the previous income and hence τ(y¯− βyT−t)+ = 0. Cases 3 and
4 describe a situation when the mother becomes eligible to the part-time subsidy.
While the reservation income for working full-time (cases 1 and 3) does not depend
on the eligibility of the part-time subsidy, the reservation income for working part-
time (cases 2 and 4) is lower when the mother is eligible. Also the decision whether
to work full-time or part-time depends on whether the mother is eligible or not.
Similarly to previous reasoning we find that
y∗INTT−t =
l if y >
y¯
β
1
1−β(1−D(ρ,t)τ) ((1− β)l + D(ρ, t)τy¯) if y < y¯β .
(4.4)
Again, the two cases discriminate the reservation income of the intensive margin
depending on part-time subsidy eligibility. If not eligible, mothers are indifferent
between working part-time and full-time such that they value an additional unit
leisure equally to an additional unit of income. If eligible, the offered income has
4We get these results by (C.2) of Appendix C.
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to equal the utility from leisure plus the time value of the subsidy in order to make
mothers indifferent between the two options.
4.3.3 Implications of the reform
The reform changed two parameters simultaneously. First and foremost, it gives
mothers the choice to double the maximum parental leave duration if working up
to 30 hours per week. Secondly, it optionally halved the replacement rate in case of
not working.5
Duration effects
We first of all notice that for any period T − t in parental leave an increase in T can
be modelled by an increase in t (the end of the maximum duration period is farer
away). Since V fT−t = V
f
T+t, V
p
T−t > V
p
T+t and V
pl
T−t−1 > V
pl
T−t for any t ≥ 0, we
have that ∂V
pl
T−t
∂t > 0. These results and
∂D(ρ,t)
∂t > 0 directly imply that the reservation
income of the extensive margin increases for cases 1-3. For the fourth case we obtain
∂y∗EXTT−t
∂t
=
1
β(1− τD(ρ, t))
 ρ1+ ρ ∂V
pl
T−t
∂t︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−τ ∂D(ρ, t)
∂t︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(y¯− βy∗EXTT−t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 (4.5)
and so the overall effect is ambiguous. It can be decomposed in the additional value
of staying in parental leave and its forgone part-time subsidy.
If eligible to the part-time subsidy, we find for the reservation income at the intensive
margin that
∂y∗INTT−t
∂t
=
τ
1− β(1− D(ρ, t)τ)
∂D(ρ, t)
∂t︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(y¯− βy∗INTT−t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0. (4.6)
For an increased duration the part-time subsidy becomes more valuable. So, the in-
come that has to be offered in order to make the mother indifferent between working
full- or part-time has to increase.
Decreased replacement rate in case of staying on parental leave
Since ∂V
pl
T−t
∂λ > 0, the implications for the reservation income at the extensive margin
for cases 1 to 4 of (4.3) follow in a straightforward manner.
5The reform also decreased the subsidy schedule τ for λy¯2 ≤ τ(y¯− βy) under very special circum-
stances. For the sake of readability we neglect this feature.
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Total effect on reservation incomes
The preceding analysis shows that the total effect on the reservation income at the
extensive margin can be summarized for cases 1 to 3 as follows:
dy∗EXTT−t =

ρ
1+ρ
(
∂VplT−t
∂t dt +
∂VplT−t
∂λ dλ
)
if y > y¯β and y > l
1
β
ρ
1+ρ
(
∂VplT−t
∂t dt +
∂VplT−t
∂λ dλ
)
if y > y¯β and y < l
ρ
1+ρ
(
∂VplT−t
∂t dt +
∂VplT−t
∂λ dλ
)
if y < y¯β and
y > l + 11−βD(ρ, t)τ(y¯− βy).
(4.7)
Since ∂V
pl
T−t
∂t dt > 0 and
∂VplT−t
∂λ dλ < 0, the effect is in principle ambiguous for each
case. However, for cases 1 and 2 where mothers are not eligible to the part-time
subsidy, we notice that the overall effect should be very small. Likewise for case 3
we postulate that ∂V
pl
T−t
∂t dt +
∂VplT−t
∂λ dλ > 0 since the duration effect should more than
compensate for the decrease in the replacement rate due to the positive effect on the
value of the part-time subsidy. For case 4 we have
dy∗EXTT−t =
1
β(1− τD(ρ, t))∗ ρ1+ ρ
(
∂VplT−t
∂t
dt +
∂VplT−t
∂λ
dλ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− τ ∂D(ρ, t)
∂t
(y¯− βy∗EXTT−t )dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 (4.8)
and hence, the overall effect on the reservation income of the extensive margin is
ambiguous. Like the partial effect in (4.5), it includes the additional value of stay-
ing in parental leave minus the forgone part-time subsidy. If the additional value of
staying in parental leave predominates, mothers will prolong the employment inter-
ruption.
However, if eligible to the subsidy, for the reservation income of the intensive mar-
gin we find the total reform effect
dy∗INTT−t =
∂y∗INTT−t
∂t
dt > 0. (4.9)
Hence, mothers need a higher compensation to work full-time and so the relative
attractiveness of working part-time increases.
To conclude, our theoretical model predicts a positive effect of the reform on part-
time employment. Since the effects on the extensive margin are ambiguous, though,
the question arises if the hypothesized increase in part-time labour supply reduces
full-time labour supply or has positive employment effects. We will test these impli-
cations empirically in the next section.
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4.4 Estimation strategy
4.4.1 Identification
The identification of causal effects typically requires to imagine a counterfactual sit-
uation in which the individuals exposed to the reform would not have been exposed.
We exploit the exogenous variation induced by the parental leave reform to define
an indicator variable D ∈ {0, 1} such that D = 0 whenever a mother gave birth
shortly before July and D = 1 whenever the mother gave birth shortly after that
date. A possible identification strategy could be to compare mothers in D = 0 with
those in D = 1 in case many data points are available exactly at the cut-off. Any
difference in the employment outcomes of interest Y could now be attributed to the
change of the part-time subsidy scheme if nothing else drives a potential difference
in the outcomes.6 However, any estimation strategy, that exploits information away
from the cut-off date to increase the sample size, might potentially be exposed to
seasonal patterns and time trends. In our setting the starting date of the school year
could invalidate such an analysis. Depending on the federal state, the school year
usually starts in August or September and child care attendance follows this time
plan. Children who are already one year old have better chances to get a child care
slot. This implies that children born before the cut-off date who are slightly older
than those born after the cut-off date might have a higher probability to attend child
care. If employment decisions of mothers systematically differ shortly before and
after the cut-off date due to the availability of public child care, then a measured
difference in the outcomes can not be purely attributed to the reform. We account
for this by comparing the difference in outcomes in 2015 (T = 1) to the difference in
the previous year (T = 0). Similar to prior articles (Cygan-Rehm, 2016; Cygan-Rehm
et al., 2018; Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014), this DiD identification strategy yields an
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) in T = 1 under certain assumptions.
To clarify things, consider the potential outcomes framework proposed by Rubin
(1973). In general, denote variables with capital letters and its realizations with low-
ercase letters. Define the potential outcome for the two time periods as Yd0 and Y
d
1
such that for every observation in the sample only the potential outcome with D = d
of the realized outcome is observed. Further, we observe some covariates which
we denote by X. Then, Heckman et al. (1997) show that our parameter of interest
ATET = θ = E
[
Y11 −Y01 |D = 1
]
is identified under the following set of assump-
tions.
Assumption 1 (Common trends):
E
[
Y01 −Y00 |X, D = 0
]
= E
[
Y01 −Y00 |X, D = 1
]
.
In words, conditional on X the average outcomes for D = 0 and D = 1 would
have followed parallel trends in the absence of the treatment. In our setting this
means that the difference in outcomes between mothers giving birth shortly before
6This identification strategy was applied by some studies in the context of parental leave imple-
mentation using a cut-off date (e.g., Dahl et al., 2016).
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and after the cut-off date stays constant between 2014 and 2015 in the absence of the
reform. In general, the assumption is empirically not testable and there might be evi-
dence that can raise doubts concerning the validity of the assumption. Following the
standard in the literature, in our sensitivity analysis we estimate effects for periods
where we would not expect an effect (placebo reform). Crucially, the assumption
might only hold conditional on some covariates X. For example, local economic
differences or personal characteristics of mothers might affect the trends differently.
The inclusion of a rich set of covariates may therefore help to make the assumption
more credible. For our analysis we use geographic information as well as personal
characteristics like education or the employment history. If the unconditional mean
differences drastically differ from an estimator with many included controls, this
may at least be interpreted as a non-robustness against the chosen specification. In
other words, if specifications with many control variables shift the results, it is very
likely that some form of observed common trend confounding, that may or may not
be fully adjusted for, takes place. Clearly, this argument does not rule out some form
of common trend confounding, that is unrelated to the rich set of control variables
included.
Assumption 2 (Observational rule): The outcome process follows the observational
rule
Yt =
Y0t if Dt = 0Y1t if Dt = 1.
Hence, we require that reform exposure of one mother does not affect the outcome of
another mother. The assumption can be violated if being exposed to the reform has
an impact on a colleague’s or a friend’s reemployment decision. While we cannot
completely rule out this kind of peer effect, we argue that the narrow birth interval of
four weeks for reform exposure makes the occurrence of peer effects very unlikely.7
Assumption 3 (No anticipation): E
[
Y10 −Y00 |D = 1
]
= 0.
This assumption requires that being exposed to the reform has no effect prior to the
reform and thus rules out anticipation effects. It might be violated if mothers plan
to give birth to their child in order to benefit from the new regime. This kind of
anticipation can occur in two different forms. Firstly, women considering to become
mothers could have tried to plan conception and secondly, they could have tried to
postpone the birth shortly before the calculated birthdate. The first type of antici-
pation is relevant for those mothers knowing about the reform before they are preg-
nant. However, the German parliament approved the law only in November 2014.
Hence, knowledge on the reform becoming definitely effective for births from July
2015 onwards was less than nine months before the cut-off date available when con-
cerned mothers have already been pregnant. To rule out the possibility that mothers
might have heard from the draft and waited for another few months, we analyzed
7Welteke and Wrohlich (2019) identify peer effects for mothers with births between a much longer
period (July 2007 and December 2009).
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FIGURE 4.2: Birth numbers in 2014 and 2015
(a) Official birth numbers (b) Birth numbers from BeH
Source: Own calculations from BeH and the German Federal Statistical Office (2014a, 2015a).
monthly birth numbers from 2015 in comparison with the previous year. Both statis-
tics from the German Federal Statistical Office and the imputed birth numbers from
the Employment History (BeH) used in the subsequent analysis show a similar move-
ment in 2014 and 2015 and one cannot detect any sudden increase in July 2015 (see
Figure 4.2). We handle the second type of anticipation, trying to postpone the birth-
date that might especially relevant for planned Caesarian sections, by dropping in-
dividuals with births two weeks around the cut-off date. Obviously, the two weeks
rule is arbitrary and we check the sensitivity against it in Section 4.6. Furthermore,
the share of mothers wanting a Caesarian section is rather low in Germany (at max-
imum two to three percent). The concrete definitions of the indicators D and T are
summarized in Table 4.3.
Assumption 4 (Common support): 0 < p(X) < 1 where p(X) = E [D|X].8
It follows that we exclude perfect predictability for belonging to group D = 0 or
D = 1. For our estimation procedure we enforce support by dropping observations
with no overlap.
TABLE 4.3: Treatment definition
Cut-off 01/07/2015 Control group Treated group
T = 0 mid May - mid June 2014 mid July - mid August 2014
T = 1 mid May - mid June 2015 mid July - mid August 2015
Source: Own representation.
4.4.2 Estimation of average effects
Given these assumptions, different estimands can be shown to identify the ATET. We
avoid arbitrary parametric assumptions on the data generating process. We rely in-
stead on results of the semi-parametric DiD literature. For example, Heckman et al.
(1997), Abadie (2005) and Lechner (2011) propose different variations of matching
and inverse probability weighting type estimators. Recently Sant’Anna and Zhao
8Notice that our nonparametric identification of the ATET only requires that p(X) < 1. We
strengthen this assumption because the estimation strategy proposed in the next section requires the
stronger form of common support. For details see (Zimmert, 2018).
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(2018) and Zimmert (2018) propose DiD estimators that combine propensity score
and outcome estimation (Augmented Inverse Probability Weighting AIPW). In par-
ticular, they show that
ATET = θ = E
[
1
λD
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
1− p(X) (Y− γ(X, T))
]
(4.10)
where λD = E [D], λT = E [T] and
γ(X, T) = TE [Y|X, T = 1, D = 0] + (1− T)E [Y|X, T = 0, D = 0].
Hence, the propensity score p(X) and the outcome model γ(X, T) have to be es-
timated in a first step. A major advantage of this class of estimands is that they
are doubly robust in the sense that when either the outcome model or the propen-
sity score is misspecified, the estimator is still consistent. Misspecification of the
propensity score or the outcome model is a particular concern when using paramet-
ric models. Depending on the concrete setting, the researcher faces at least two more
or less arbitrary decisions regarding the propensity score or the outcome model.
Firstly, given a set of potential controls, it is a priori unclear which ones to include
in the model. E.g., as argued before, controlling for a large set of regional dummies
might improve the credibility of the common trend assumption in our case. How-
ever, it remains for example unclear whether we should use dummies at the state
or district level. Secondly, the functional form of the covariates (polynomials, in-
teractions) that enter the model has to be manually chosen by the researcher. As
employments trends might, e.g., differ by age, controlling for this variable can be
necessary. Still, it is unclear if the covariate should enter the model in squared, some
higher order polynomial form or interacted with say a regional dummy. So-called
supervised machine learning algorithms (for an overview see Hastie et al., 2009)
partly avoid these problems and cope with settings where the dimensionality of a
model increases with the sample size. In our application a major advantage of using
machine learning algorithms compared to standard parametric models is that we
can exploit the rich information in the administrative data set more effectively.9 In
particular, we do not rely on a certain specification but choose the covariates and
their (implicit) functional form in a data-driven way. Combining machine learning
first stages and the nonparametric second stage, we are able to reduce the sensitivity
of our results towards functional form assumptions or arbitrary specification choices
to a minimum. Building on the double machine learning results of Chernozhukov
et al. (2018), Zimmert (2018) shows that the estimator based on the sample analogues
of the estimand in (4.10) converges with square-root-N to a normal distribution and
has the asymptotic variance
σ2 = E
[(
1
λD
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
1− p(X) (Y− γ(X, T))
)2]
(4.11)
9Parametric models can be regarded as submodels among the many options the algorithm can
choose.
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Procedure ATET estimation
Introduce the subsample index l = 1, 2 and denote the corresponding
information set by Il as well as its complement by ICl .
1. Randomly split the sample in equally sized subsamples 1 and 2.
2. for l = 1 to 2 do
Estimate the propensity score p(x) and the outcome projections
γ(x, 0) and γ(x, 1) in the sample with ICl using any suitable machine
learning method or an ensemble of them.
Predict pˆ(x), γˆ(x, 0) and γˆ(x, 1) in the sample with Il .
end
3. Denote pˆ(xi) = pˆ(xi)l=1,2, γˆ(xi, 0) = γˆ(xi, 0)l=1,2 and
γˆ(xi, 1) = γˆ(xi, 1)l=1,2. Then construct the vector with elements
1
λD
ti−λT
λT(1−λT)
di− pˆ(xi)
1− pˆ(xi) (yi − γˆ(xi, ti)) for i = 1, ..., N and estimate ATET as
θˆ =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
1
λD
ti − λT
λT(1− λT)
di − pˆ(xi)
1− pˆ(xi) (yi − γˆ(xi, ti)) .
as long as the propensity score and the outcome model are consistent and the prod-
uct of their convergence rates achieves N− 12 . These are much lower requirements
than for example those needed for parametric models. Importantly, the rate condi-
tions are satisfied for popular machine learning algorithms like Lasso (e.g., Belloni
and Chernozhukov, 2013) or Random Forests (Wager and Walther, 2015) under par-
ticular forms of sparsity. Hence, the flexibility or dimensionality of the models used
can grow with the sample size as long as it grows at a somewhat slower rate. An
additional requirement for the validity of the asymptotic results is that training and
prediction sample need to be separated. This gives rise to the following ATET esti-
mation procedure as proposed in Zimmert (2018).
The algorithm splits the sample in two different complementary subsamples and es-
timates the propensity score as well as the outcome projections in one of the samples.
Then the values of the propensity score and the outcome projections are predicted
in the other sample. Subsequently, this procedure is reverted such that one obtains a
vector of propensity score and outcome projection predictions for the whole sample.
These first step predictions are then plugged into the sample analogue of the esti-
mand in (4.10). Of course, one could extend this estimation principle and split the
sample into much more subsamples. This may increase the small sample efficiency
of the estimator because much more information can be used for the estimation of
the first step parameters. However, it also drastically increases the computational
burden of the procedure. In our application we argue that the sample is large enough
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such that estimation on the 50 percent subsample should not decrease efficiency too
much.
For the prediction task we use a combinations of Lasso and Random Forests. While
the Lasso as a form of penalized regression can be seen as a global nonparamet-
ric method, Random Forests are ensembles of regression trees and therefore a lo-
cal nonparametric method. We merge the predictions from the two methods by
choosing out-of-sample mean squared error optimal weights. In this way, we obtain
a purely data-driven procedure that assigns a high weight to the machine learner
which shows a good predictive performance. This should make our procedure more
robust against the tuning parameter choices of the two estimators in the ensemble.10
4.4.3 Estimation of heterogenous effects
Yet another advantage of the estimand proposed in (4.10) is its capability to infer
subgroup specific average effects. In particular, denote a subset of the observed co-
variates by Z ⊆ X. In our case Z might for example include dummies for income
groups or whether the mother worked part-time before parental leave. Then in or-
der to assess how the effect of the reform varies among these subgroups we are
interested in the parameter
θ(z) = E
[
Y11 −Y01 |D = 1, Z = z
]
.
The parameter represents a so-called conditional average treatment effect on the
treated (CATET11). Define the propensity score conditional on Z as E [D|Z] = p(Z).
Then we can show that under the assumptions in Section 4.4.1 and the further as-
sumption that p(Z) > 0, the CATET is identified as
θ(z) = E
[
1
p(Z)
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
1− p(X) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣Z = z] . (4.12)
The details for this result are provided in Appendix C. Equation (4.12) suggests to
estimate CATET as a projection of the reweighted outcome on Z. A similar strategy
was proposed in Abadie (2005) for DiD designs. However, the estimator of Abadie
(2005) for the CATET relies on least squares regression weighted by the propensity
score p(X). Since we estimate p(X) with our ensemble learner described in Sec-
tion 4.4.2, inference for this estimator might be very complicated in our setting. We
therefore reweight the transformed outcome also used in (4.10) for average effect
estimation by p(Z) instead of λD to account for the fact that we are interested in
a subpopulation that is defined conditional on D = 1 and Z = z. In practice, Z
10For the Lasso we choose the penalty term by 5-fold cross-validation and otherwise rely on the
default values in the R-package glmnet. The Random Forest is estimated using the default values in
the R-package ranger.
11For some recent contributions in other settings see (Abrevaya et al., 2015; Chernozhukov and Se-
menova, 2017; Fan et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2017; Wager and Athey, 2018; Zimmert and Lechner, 2019)
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is low-dimensional and hence p(Z) can for example be estimated using logit re-
gression. The estimand in (4.12) then suggests to simply use ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression of the transformed outcome on the independent variables Z. Cher-
nozhukov and Semenova (2017) show that this type of estimation strategy leads to
valid inference for the OLS coefficients even when the first stages p(X) and γ(X, T)
were predicted with sophisticated machine learning algorithms as described in the
previous section. In particular, they demonstrate that the first stage estimations have
no bearing on the asymptotic behaviour of the estimator. Given the results of Zim-
mert (2018), we postulate that this also holds for the DiD setting. A rigorous formal
argument is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
In contrast to the standard subgroup analysis, our procedure provides joint OLS in-
ference on the coefficients. The method may therefore be also suitable to avoid the
usual multiple testing problem when analyzing heterogeneous effects.
4.5 Data
To empirically test our proposed theoretical considerations we use comprehensive
data from the German Federal Employment Agency provided by the research data
centre (FDZ) of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The exploitation of
administrative in contrast to survey data like in previous studies (Bergemann and
Riphahn, 2010, 2015; Cygan-Rehm, 2016; Cygan-Rehm et al., 2018; Kluve and Schmitz,
2018) has some major advantages: large sample size, mandatory notification by the
employer and detailed longitudinal information on a daily basis (Müller et al., 2017).
Still, the fact that the data is collected for the use by the social security system implies
that some information normally provided in surveys is not given. Concretely, we do
not have exact information on child birth, but rely on a sophisticated imputation by
Müller et al. (2017) which is explained in the following section. As a proof of qual-
ity, imputed birth numbers will show a movement over the year similar to official
statistics. We use the population of mothers employed subject to social security con-
tributions (SSC) before (potential) child birth given in the Employment History (BeH,
version 10.03.00). As we focus on the return to work, we neglect mothers previously
not working, registered unemployed, in active labor market programs or receiving
social assistance. Moreover, the data excludes self-employed and civil servants as
they are not subject to SSC.
Child birth defines treatment
The Employment History covers all individual employment spells on a daily basis.
While employers have to notify authorities at least once a year, notifications are fur-
thermore only recorded if the employment spell ends. The imputation of the day
of child birth is based on this information. Employers register when an expectant
mother exits her job for the period of maternity protection and receives payment
by the statutory health insurance. In general, maternity protection begins six weeks
74 Chapter 4. Paid parental leave and maternal reemployment
FIGURE 4.3: Imputed and official birth numbers in 2015
Source: Own calculations from BeH and the German Federal Statisti-
cal Office (2015a).
before the calculated birthday such that Müller et al. (2017) add six weeks of ma-
ternity protection to impute child birth. Unfortunately, the exit reason "receiving
entitlements from statutory health insurance" can also include long-term sickness
(≥ six weeks). However, misspecifications can be minimized by three restrictions.
Firstly, the group of young women is more likely to have a child, but less likely to
suffer from long-term sickness. Based on official birth statistics, Müller et al. (2017)
restrict the childbearing age to 38 years for the first birth and to 40 years for subse-
quent births. Secondly, mothers are not allowed to work during the 14 weeks lasting
period of maternity protection. Any shorter job interruption period is more likely
to specify a break due to illness. Thirdly, subsequent births are only possible after
a period of about 40 weeks. As the pre-term rate was found to be 9.2 percent in
2010 (March of Dimes et al., 2012), the authors limit the gap to 32 weeks. As we
only observe births from mothers previously employed subject to SSC, total num-
bers are smaller compared to official statistics for whole Germany. However, Figure
4.3 shows that the movement in the considered period is very similar for the official
birth numbers and imputed births which highlights the quality of the imputation
and the data in general. Additionally, we argue that the exclusion of a certain time
window around the cut-off date should mitigate the problem. In section 4.6.1 we
will show that our results are insensitive to the specific choice of the window width
indicating that the imputation error is empirically a minor concern. We observe be-
tween 22,000 and 30,000 births per month while sample size in similar studies using
survey data amounts to about 2,000 births for the same period.
Control and outcome variables
TABLE 4.4: Descriptive statistics of covariates by group membership
Control Treated Stan-
group group dardized
Variable Mean sd Mean sd difference
Age 29.36 3.45 29.31 3.47 -0.013
Number of children 1.301 0.522 1.301 0.520 -2.8E-04
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Migration background 0.066 0.248 0.066 0.249 0.002
Place of living (Federal state, baseline Schleswig-Holstein:)
Hamburg 0.024 0.152 0.023 0.151 -0.001
Lower Saxony 0.088 0.283 0.088 0.284 0.002
Bremen 0.007 0.082 0.006 0.077 -0.010
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.187 0.390 0.185 0.388 -0.007
Hessen 0.069 0.253 0.072 0.259 0.013
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.045 0.207 0.045 0.208 0.002
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.133 0.339 0.134 0.340 0.003
Bavaria 0.168 0.374 0.173 0.378 0.013
Saarland 0.012 0.108 0.010 0.100 -0.016
Berlin 0.046 0.209 0.044 0.206 -0.008
Brandenburg 0.036 0.186 0.034 0.182 -0.007
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 0.022 0.148 0.023 0.150 0.003
Saxony 0.067 0.251 0.067 0.251 -1.3E-04
Saxony-Anhalt 0.030 0.171 0.030 0.171 1.2E-04
Thuringia 0.033 0.178 0.031 0.174 -0.009
Education (baseline Lower/middle secondary school without vocational training):
Lower/middle secondary school with vocational 0.494 0.500 0.488 0.500 -0.011
training
High school without vocational training 0.022 0.148 0.023 0.150 0.004
High school with vocational training 0.199 0.399 0.199 0.399 -0.001
University of applied sciences 0.022 0.147 0.023 0.150 0.007
University 0.179 0.383 0.185 0.388 0.015
Days in
marginal employment within last five years 122.56 259.24 122.60 260.33 1.5E-04
part-time employment within last five years 327.67 497.69 331.20 500.38 0.007
full-time employment within last five years 979.62 652.75 982.60 655.75 0.005
Previous job:
Employment pattern (baseline Marginal employment):
Part-time 0.309 0.462 0.309 0.462 0.001
Full-time 0.645 0.478 0.644 0.479 -0.002
Gross monthly income in Euros 2195.92 1241.25 2219.98 1245.32 0.019
Temporary contract 0.225 0.418 0.224 0.417 -0.002
Requirement level (baseline Unskilled or semi-skilled activities):
Specialist activities 0.664 0.472 0.663 0.473 -0.004
Complex specialist activities 0.123 0.329 0.121 0.327 -0.006
Highly complex activities 0.119 0.324 0.122 0.328 0.009
Occupational area (classification system Kldb2010 1-digit,
baseline Agriculture, forestry, farming, and gardening):
Production of raw materials and goods 0.061 0.240 0.063 0.243 0.007
and manufacturing
Construction, architecture, surveying 0.008 0.089 0.007 0.086 -0.006
and technical building services
Natural sciences, geography and 0.021 0.142 0.019 0.138 -0.009
informatics
Traffic, logistics, safety and security 0.048 0.213 0.046 0.210 -0.007
Commercial services, trading, sales, 0.187 0.390 0.183 0.387 -0.010
the hotel business and tourism
Business organization, accounting, law 0.249 0.432 0.254 0.435 0.012
and administration
Health care, the social sector, teaching 0.382 0.486 0.383 0.486 0.003
and education
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Philology, literature, humanities, 0.035 0.184 0.035 0.184 1.5E-04
social sciences, economics, media,
art, culture, and design
Establishment:
Number of female employees 334 999 340 1019 0.006
Total number of employees 695 3049 712 3173 0.005
N 46,263 48,212
Notes: Instead of using federal states like presented in the table, districts are used for the
prediction of the propensity score and the outcome equation. sd = standard deviation.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH),
establishment data from the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
The Employment History includes a large set of other individual and job-related char-
acteristics that we use to predict the propensity score and the outcome equation
explained in Section 4.4.2. These are measured at the last employment spell, i.e.,
right before child birth. We include the individual age, the number of children, a
binary indicator for having a migration background and the place of residence on
the district level. Inserting regional fixed effects is especially important to control
for the macroeconomic background or the availability of child care facilities show-
ing large variation over German districts (compare Chapter 3). With the inclusion of
402 districts the number of covariates gets large. While standard parametric models
might not converge at these levels of dimensionality, our machine learning approach
is able to flexibly include this large list of control variables.
Further information relate to education12 and occupational characteristics. We in-
clude six categories for the educational degree combined with information on the oc-
cupation (lower/middle secondary school with(out) vocational training, high school
with(out) vocational training, university of applied sciences, university). Other co-
variates concern the requirement level (unskilled up to highly complex activities)
and the occupational code both coming from the German classification of occupa-
tions KldB2010.
To control for the individual employment history the days spent in marginal, part-
or full-time employment within the last five years and the working time pattern of
the previous job (marginal, part- or full-time employment) are considered. The Em-
ployment History does not contain information on continuously measured working
hours. Hence, we use the working time pattern which is provided by the employer
as the ninth digit of the classification of occupations and merge additional particu-
larities, i.e., marginal employment as special form of a part-time contract. Marginal
employment in Germany, so-called Mini jobs, do not exceed earnings of 450 Euro per
month and are exempted from income taxation.
The gross monthly income is a generated variable that considers the duration of the
12As the variable is characterized by a higher share of missing or inconsistent values compared
to other information provided by the employer, we rely on an imputation procedure proposed by
Fitzenberger et al. (2005).
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employment spell. As employers only have to indicate income up to the SSC assess-
ment ceiling,13 this variable is right censored. Special payments and misdeclarations
can shift the upper ceiling such that we restrict the income range to up to 6,500 Euro
per month. The type of working contract (fixed- or long-term) is also controlled
for. Additionally, we also include information on the number of (female) employees
coming from the IAB Establishment History Panel (BHP, version 7516 v1).
Table 4.4 shows mean values and their standard deviation of the previously de-
scribed covariates by group status. The last column gives the standardized mean
difference (Rubin, 2001) between these two groups and demonstrates that the sam-
ple is well balanced as all values are close to zero.
Unfortunately, the data does not contain information on actual receipt of parental
subsidies. So, our estimates are intention to treat-effects.
The outcome variables of interest refer to employment after child birth. Since em-
ployment spells are available until the end of 2017, we can analyze maternal labor
market outcomes up to two years. We measure current employment (in full- or part-
time as well as in marginal employment) as binary indicators every three months
until the second birthday of the child, i.e., at eight different points in time. Figure
4.4 gives mean outcomes for the treated group before the reform and shows that
employment rates are increasing with the child’s age. Before the first birthday the
employment rate amounts to about 20 percent and is mainly characterized by full-
time jobs. Interestingly, the employment rate sharply increases to about 60 percent
until the second birthday with the highest share consisting of part-time contracts. It
seems that the average pre-reform mother takes the maximum parental leave period
of twelve months and returns in a part-time job.
We analyze other variables of job continuity depicted by a binary indicator for stay-
ing with the same employer and job quality in terms of earnings accumulated up to
the first and second year. The second column of Table 4.5 shows that about 52 per-
cent of treated mothers return to their previous employer before the reform while
average earnings amount to 1,744 Euro in the first year and to 13,492 Euro up to the
second birthday (including those with zero earnings who have not returned yet).
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Estimation results for ATET and sensitivity analysis
We present our main estimation results in graphs where the time in months after
child birth is depicted on the horizontal axis and the ATET on the vertical axis. Apart
from the machine learning augmented DiD estimator (solid line), we also show re-
sults of the unadjusted mean estimator without including any covariates (dashed
line).
We start by discussing the overall employment effect in Figure 4.5a. The reform gives
13For the statutory pension insurance, the assessment ceiling amounts to 6,050 Euro in 2015. For the
health insurance, it was 4,125 Euro in 2015.
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FIGURE 4.4: Outcome means of treated mothers before reform
Notes: T = 0 in 2014. N = 23, 993.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employ-
ment History (BeH).
increasing and positive employment effects up to nine months after birth amounting
to statistically significant two percentage points at maximum. Although the effect
size seems to be small, it accounts for about 0.0200.138 = 14 percent of the pre-reform
mean. Additionally, since take up only amounts to about 19 percent (Federal Statis-
tical Office, 2019), the effect for those actually choosing the new regime should be
much higher.14 The effect vanishes when the child turns one year old indicating that
the first birthday remains a reference point for the majority of previously employed
mothers. 18 months after child birth the ATET slightly increases again, but does not
reach significance on conventional levels.
How is this overall positive employment effect in the first year distributed over dif-
ferent employment patterns? Figures 4.5b to 4.5d show that part-time employment
mainly drives this finding. At maximum the part-time effect equals about one per-
centage point which is one half of the overall employment increase. The reform’s
impact on full-time employment is close to zero. Marginal employment as form of
part-time employment is also not significantly affected.
These empirical findings are in line with the proposed model mechanisms of Sec-
tion 4.3 predicting a decrease of the reservation income for a part-time job relative
to a full-time job. Moreover, we find that the theoretically ambiguous effect on the
extensive employment margin is empirically positive. Interestingly, the seemingly
positive effect on the attractiveness of part-time employment is not associated by a
drop in full-time employment. Instead, it is reflected by an increase in overall em-
ployment which means that the additional value of further staying in parental leave
is dominated by the effect of the forgone part-time subsidy.
We do not identify any persistent employment patterns, i.e., the distribution into
full-, part-time or marginal employment is not affected until the child’s second birth-
day. This might suggest that those mothers incentivized to return before the child’s
14We are cautious when interpreting DiD results in a Wald estimator kind of manner. For example
De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2017) show that such an argumentation may only be valid under
very restrictive assumptions.
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FIGURE 4.5: Baseline estimation results
(a) Employment (b) Part-time
(c) Full-time (d) Marginal employment
Notes: Treatment status is measured six weeks around cut-off date excluding the two weeks on each side of the
cut-off date. T = 1 in 2015, T = 0 in 2014. N = 94, 475. Grey shaded areas depict pointwise 95 % confidence
intervals. AIPW DiD is solid line. Unadjusted DiD is dashed line.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and establishment data from
the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
first birthday under a part-time contract would have also returned in part-time un-
der the pre-reform regime after the child’s first birthday. In turn, mothers who
would have returned in full-time employment under the pre-reform regulations
might not be willing to accept reduced working hours supplemented by parental
benefits before the child’s first birthday as they might fear to get stuck in a part-time
contract.
Panel A of Table 4.5 shows that the overall positive employment effects reflect in
higher accumulated earnings within the first year (about 273 Euro) and less pre-
cisely estimated within the second year (about 314 Euro). Furthermore, the shorter
employment break does not affect the probability to return to the previous employer.
The validity of our findings is supported by the fact that the unconditional mean
differences (dashed lines) are very close to our estimation results using a rich set of
covariates. If our setting would be sensitive to confounding with respect to one of
the observed covariates, we would expect different results for the simple differences
in means estimator and our procedure. Moreover, we examine the plausibility of
the common trend assumption between treatment and control group in absence of
the reform by postponing the reform year to 2014. While this kind of check cannot
directly test the assumption, Figure 4.6 hints at similar employment trends before
the reform reflected in ATETs that are precisely measured at around zero. Earnings
and job continuity are as well not affected (compare Panel B of Table 4.5).
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TABLE 4.5: ATETs for job continuity and accumulated earnings
Outcome D = 1, T = 0 Unadjusted DiD AIPW
Mean sd ATET se ATET se
Panel A: Baseline
Same employer 0.522 0.500 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006
Accumulated earnings
1st year 1,743.86 5,370.63 282.38*** 72.23 272.66*** 71.41
2nd year 13,492.12 16,178.52 430.09** 211.53 314.32* 191.22
Notes: Treatment status is measured six weeks around the cut-off date excluding the two weeks on each side
of the cut-off date. T = 1 in 2015, T = 0 in 2014. N = 94, 475.
Panel B: Placebo
Same employer 0.561 0.496 -0.016** 0.007 -0.009 0.006
Accumulated earnings
1st year 1,656.53 5,343.75 -76.78 73.17 -73.00 71.84
2nd year 12,556.42 15,652.03 -91.02 213.05 44.81 192.52
Notes: Treatment status is measured six weeks around the cut-off date excluding the two weeks on each side
of the cut-off date. T = 1 in 2014, T = 0 in 2013. N = 89, 374.
Panel C: Small bandwidth
Same employer 0.547 0.498 0.015* 0.009 0.016* 0.009
Accumulated earnings
1st year 1,613.31 5,339.65 237.27** 99.82 242.32** 98.37
2nd year 12,909.01 15,939.58 171.54 294.15 189.89 264.31
Notes: Treatment status is measured four weeks around the cut-off date excluding the two weeks on each side
of the cut-off date. T = 1 in 2015, T = 0 in 2014. N = 48, 544.
Panel D: Large bandwidth
Same employer 0.553 0.497 0.005 0.006 -3.9E-04 0.006
Accumulated earnings
1st year 1,731.44 5,483.04 262.78*** 73.40 268.16*** 73.73
2nd year 13,257.52 16,289.88 620.13*** 214.52 337.54* 194.84
Notes: Treatment status is measured eight weeks around the cut-off date excluding the four weeks on each side
of the cut-off date. T = 1 in 2015, T = 0 in 2014. N = 94, 493.
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and establishment data from
the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
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FIGURE 4.6: Estimation results of placebo reform
(a) Employment (b) Part-time
(c) Full-time (d) Marginal employment
Notes: Treatment status is measured six weeks around cut-off date excluding the two weeks on each side of the
cut-off date. T = 1 in 2014, T = 0 in 2013. N = 89, 374. Grey shaded areas depict pointwise 95 % confidence
intervals. AIPW DiD is solid line. Unadjusted DiD is dashed line.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and establishment data from
the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
A second potential concern in our empirical strategy might be the arbitrary defini-
tion of the sampling periods around the cut-off date and the imputation error of the
child’s birthday (see Section 4.5). We check the sensitivity against these two threats
by estimating the effects for different populations. Figure 4.7 shows the employment
effects for a smaller bandwidth around the cut-off date of four weeks excluding the
two weeks around this date on each side. The employment pattern induced by the
reform stays the same compared to the baseline estimates: mothers return earlier in
a part-time job. However, we find slightly different effects on accumulated earnings
and job continuity (compare Panel C of Table 4.5). The same holds for increasing the
bandwidth to eight weeks around the cut-off date with the exclusion of four weeks
on each side (compare Figure 4.8). We conclude that our results are robust regarding
these potential issues.
As a possible channel driving the employment outcomes, we look at the effect on
subsequent births. E.g., Cygan-Rehm (2016) shows that the parental leave reform of
2007 incentivized mothers to postpone a subsequent pregnancy. Figure 4.9 does not
indicate any effect on childbearing within the two year-horizon. However, this find-
ing has to be interpreted with caution as we only observe women with subsequent
births who have been employed in the meanwhile.
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FIGURE 4.7: Estimation results with small bandwidth
(a) Employment (b) Part-time
(c) Full-time (d) Marginal employment
Notes: Treatment status is measured four weeks around cut-off date excluding the two weeks on each side of the
cut-off date. T = 1 in 2015, T = 0 in 2014. N = 48, 544. Grey shaded areas depict pointwise 95 % confidence
intervals. AIPW DiD is solid line. Unadjusted DiD is dashed line.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and establishment data from
the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
FIGURE 4.8: Estimation results with large bandwidth
(a) Employment (b) Part-time
(c) Full-time (d) Marginal employment
Notes: Treatment status is measured eight weeks around cut-off date excluding the four weeks on each side of
the cut-off date. T = 1 in 2015, T = 0 in 2014. N = 94, 493. Grey shaded areas depict pointwise 95 % confidence
intervals. AIPW DiD is solid line. Unadjusted DiD is dashed line.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and establishment data from
the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
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FIGURE 4.9: Estimation results for subsequent birth within next 24
months
Notes: Treatment status is measured six weeks around cut-off date
excluding the two weeks on each side of the cut-off date. T = 1 in
2015, T = 0 in 2014. N = 94, 475. Grey shaded areas depict pointwise
95 % confidence intervals. AIPW DiD is solid line. Unadjusted DiD
is dashed line.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employ-
ment History (BeH) and establishment data from the Establishment His-
tory Panel (BHP).
4.6.2 Estimation results for conditional effects
To better understand the channels of the reform, we investigate how the treatment
effects vary over different pre-specified subgroups.15 We investigate different in-
come groups as well as heterogeneities concerning the prior working time pattern
and the place of living (East and West Germany). The latter might yield interest-
ing results as mothers growing up in the former GDR could have different attitudes
towards maternal employment. Hence, in our setting Z contains dummies for the
middle and high income groups, whether the mother worked full-time previous to
child birth and a dummy for West Germany. In particular, we estimate the following
specification using OLS regression
y˜ = β0 + βz + e
where y˜ represents the sample analogue of 1pˆ(Z)
T−λT
λT(1−λT)
D− pˆ(X)
1− pˆ(X) (Y − γˆ(X, T)) with
first stages estimated as for the average effects and pˆ(Z) by logit regression. The
resulting OLS coefficients give the effect variation for the different subgroups. They
are depicted on the vertical axis for the eight different periods in Figures 4.10 to 4.13.
As discussed in Section 4.4.3 we report the usual OLS standard errors.
Figures 4.10a and 4.11a show that the effect size for employment does not differ with
respect to income (low income is chosen as reference group). When we further dif-
ferentiate the employment effects in part-time and full-time as well as marginal em-
ployment, Figure 4.10b reveals that the positive part-time effects are mainly driven
by middle income earners. E.g., after nine months the part-time effect for middle
income earners is about 1.3 percentage points higher compared with low income
15The respective pre-reform outcome means of these subgroups are depicted in Figures B.5 and B.6.
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mothers.16 For high-income mothers, the effects do not significantly differ from
those with lower income (see Figure 4.10). Hence, we conclude that high-income
and potentially more career-oriented mothers prefer not to return in part-time em-
ployment despite the simultaneous provision of parental subsidies since they fear
the implications of reducing their working time. Mothers with middle income may
be more willing to accept a part-time job because the future potential income loss
after expiration of parental benefits is less severe. This argumentation is strongly
supported for examining the subgroup of previously full-time employed women.
Figure 4.12b demonstrates that they have a lower probability (-1.3 to -3.7 percentage
points) to return in part-time employment in the first year after child birth. As their
opportunity costs of taking up a part-time job are higher, they are characterized by
a weaker response to the reform. We explain the similar effect size of low- and high-
income mothers with the amount of the part-time subsidy. Low-income mothers are
more likely to receive the minimum amount of 150 Euro such that the incentive to
return before the child’s first birthday is in general less pronounced. The effects for
full-time and marginal employment do not significantly differ over subgroups.
Interestingly, the effect size does not significantly vary with the place of living, i.e.,
East and West Germany (see Figure 4.13). Bergemann and Riphahn (2015) and Kluve
and Schmitz (2014) provide suggestive evidence that the parental leave reform of
2007 defines a social norm to return to work after the child’s first birthday. In this
regard, the new policy has the potential to further increase cultural acceptance for
those mothers preferring a return even before the child turns one year old (Zoch and
Hondralis, 2017). As a legacy of the German Democratic Republic, societal accep-
tance of maternal employment and the reliance on external child care are on general
on a higher level in East Germany (e.g., Hanel and Riphahn, 2012). Consequently,
a shift of social norms becomes more likely in the West German society where tra-
ditional approaches of the household’s division of labor predominate. However,
we do not observe statistically significant differences until the child’s first birthday
for mothers living in West Germany compared to East Germany (Figure 4.13a and
4.13b). Thus, we do not find suggestive evidence for a shift of social norms induced
by the reform. As the administrative character of the data does not allow to follow
up on this suggestion, we interpret it with caution.
Moreover, the financial incentive for part-time work, does not affect maternal em-
ployment outcomes after the child’s first birthday for almost all subgroups. How-
ever, prior full-time working mothers have a lower probability for working part-time
of up to 4.1 percentage points shortly before the child gets two years old. Hence, the
reform may foster the path dependency of working part-time, at least for the short
period of two years.
16Table A.5 in the appendix shows that these effects reflect in higher accumulated earnings within the
first year. In the main analysis we concentrate on the CATETs for the different working time patterns.
See Table A.5 for a detailed presentation.
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FIGURE 4.10: Estimation results for middle income group
(a) Employment (b) Part-time
(c) Full-time (d) Marginal employment
Notes: Low (middle, high) income corresponds to 1st (2nd, 3rd) tercile of gross previous monthly income.
Nlow_income = 31, 170, Nmiddle_income = 32, 139 and Nhigh_income = 31, 166. The coefficients give the effect variation for
the respective subgroup. The reference group is low income. Grey shaded areas depict pointwise 95 % confidence
intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and establishment data from
the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
FIGURE 4.11: Estimation results for high income group
(a) Employment (b) Part-time
(c) Full-time (d) Marginal employment
Notes: Low (middle, high) income corresponds to 1st (2nd, 3rd) tercile of gross previous monthly income.
Nlow_income = 31, 170, Nmiddle_income = 32, 139 and Nhigh_income = 31, 166. The coefficients give the effect variation for
the respective subgroup. The reference group is low income. Grey shaded areas depict pointwise 95 % confidence
intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and establishment data from
the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
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FIGURE 4.12: Estimation results for prior full-time
(a) Employment (b) Part-time
(c) Full-time (d) Marginal employment
Notes: Npart_time = 29, 214 and N f ull_time = 60, 913. Coefficient gives effect variation for respective subgroup. The
reference group is prior part-time and marginal employment. Grey shaded areas depict pointwise 95 % confidence
intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and establishment data from
the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
FIGURE 4.13: Estimation results for West Germany
(a) Employment (b) Part-time
(c) Full-time (d) Marginal employment
Notes: Neast = 21, 967 and Nwest = 72, 508. The coefficients give the effect variation for the respective subgroup.
The reference group is East Germany. Grey shaded areas depict pointwise 95 % confidence intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and establishment data from
the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
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4.7 Discussion
Although the overall employment effects amount to about 14 percent of the pre-
reform mean, the new regulations, and consequently a return to work before the
child’s first birthday are only attractive to about 20 percent of all female benefit re-
cipients (Federal Statistical Office, 2019). In this regard, analyzing individual work-
ing hour preferences can be helpful to understand if the remaining 80 percent prefer
spending time with the child (working hour preferences are expected to stay close
to zero) or if the availability of child care plays a role (working hour preferences are
expected to rise). Chapter 3 shows that family policies have the potential to change
individual preferences albeit they move on average quite similarly to agreed work-
ing hours. Unfortunately, information of working hour preferences is not given in
the administrative data we use for the empirical analysis. One also has to keep in
mind that our estimates are intention to treat-effects and estimates considering ac-
tual receipt of the parental subsidy would be higher. Moreover, it might be possible
that only well informed mothers know about the implementation of the reform. As
pre-reform regulations are effective for several years and there are many different
websites to calculate the benefit amount, we expect it to be a minor issue.
Different countries, notably the United States, discuss an introduction of paid ma-
ternity protection or parental leave respectively. Therefore, it might be of interest to
investigate the financial expenditure. Given the limited information that we have
to calculate the individual tax revenue, we estimate the welfare gain for switching
from the old to the new regulations. The "average" mother in our sample has an aver-
age monthly gross income of 2,263 Euro before child birth (net: 1,506 Euro17) which
is in line with official statistics (Federal Statistical Office, 2019). Assume a mother
cares for her child until it turns six months old and receives the full basic amount
of parental benefits,18 before she returns in a part-time job with a gross monthly
income of 1,528 Euro as in our sample (net: 1,124 Euro) and receives the reduced
subsidy until the child’s second birthday. The total benefit amount in Euro of this
average mother is
4 months ∗ 1, 506 ∗ 0.65+ 18 months ∗ (1, 506− 1, 124) ∗ 0.67 = 8, 532.
In case she received the full basic amount until the first birthday, it would be
10 months ∗ 1, 506 ∗ 0.65 = 9, 792 Euro.
17The German taxation system is based upon the household. For the tax class we assume an approx-
imately egalitarian household income between partners (class 4).
18Note that the first two months are maternity protection during which maternity allowances are
paid to previously employed women by the health insurance and the employer.
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Additional part-time work generates a tax revenue of about 552 Euro until the child’s
first birthday. Then, the total public savings of the new regulation amounts to
9, 792− 8, 532+ 552 = 1, 812 Euro or to 1, 812 ∗ 36, 229 = 65, 652, 600 Euro
for the 36,229 mothers of the birth cohort of the third quarter in 2015 deciding for
the new policy. While the monthly tax revenue cannot compensate the parental
leave subsidy, this short-term total welfare gain for switching the parental leave reg-
ulations is substantial. Note however, that this simple cost-benefit-analysis does not
consider public child care expenditure that might offset the total public savings.
4.8 Conclusion
Improving the labor market prospects of young mothers may imply strong welfare
gains. We analyze a German parental leave reform promoting a fast return to part-
time work after child birth while receiving parental benefits. Although shorter em-
ployment interruptions can improve career prospects, the policy could have pushed
mothers to reduce working hours instead of returning to a full-time job when the
child is older. Our results from semi-parametric DiD estimation in combination with
machine learning algorithms do not provide evidence for such a downside. The re-
form rather yields additional part-time effects before the child’s birthday of up to
one percentage point driven by mothers who would have also returned to a part-
time job in absence of the reform. Heterogenous effects support this argumentation.
We find that mothers with lower opportunity costs of accepting a part-time job (i.e.,
those with middle previous income and prior part-time workers) show a stronger
response to the reform.
Previous regulations established the child’s first birthday as a reference point for
the parental leave duration reinforced by the legal claim for a child care slot intro-
duced in 2013. Insignificant differences for West and East Germany found in this
paper do not hint at the potential to further change societal expectations when to
return to work. Our findings have to be interpreted in the context of a labor market
in which working mothers with children younger than one year old are a minority
and the German tax and health insurance systems additionally promote an inegali-
tarian household division of paid working hours. This might also explain why the
introduction of the new parental benefit system does not indicate better employ-
ment prospects in terms of working hours for those women deciding for an early
return to work. To further support employees with a temporary preference for a
working hour reduction, the German government recently enforced a legal claim to
return to a full-time job which might especially be a good instrument for mothers
after parental leave. Hence, it would be interesting to learn about long-term effects
of the parental leave reform also in combination with the right to return in full-time.
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This thesis examines individual labor supply with a special focus on working hour
preferences and maternal employment.
The first article analyzes how household and occupational factors contribute to the
evolution of working hour discrepancies defined as the difference between preferred
and actual working hours. The results from a discrete duration analysis point out
that the occupational autonomy within the job is one of the main driving factors
for explaining the creation and resolution of hour discrepancies. Furthermore, there
are gender differences concerning mother- and fatherhood, i.e., especially mothers
of young children have a lower probability to fulfill the desire for an hour increase.
Based on these findings, the following two articles evaluate policies addressing fam-
ilies with children younger than three years old.
The second article examines the public child care expansion culminating in a legal
claim for a child care slot from August 2013 onwards. Before the legal claim came
into force, child care attendance for under three-year-olds is on a low level in Ger-
many (25.2 percent in 2011, 19.8 percent in West Germany, 49.0 percent in East Ger-
many according to the Federal Statistical Office, 2011b). Hence, the availability of
low cost subsidized child care has a high potential to increase maternal employment
in particular the agreed working hours of underemployed mothers. The empiri-
cal analysis uses exogenous variation of the child care expansion for difference-in-
differences (DiD) estimation and the findings suggest on average positive effects on
the extensive and intensive employment margin. As agreed and preferred work-
ing hours change similarly and the shares of under- and overemployed as well as
unconstrained mothers are not significantly affected, the article concludes that the
availability of child care can tap employment potentials beyond those of currently
underemployed.
Available child care is a precondition for an early return to work of young moth-
ers after the birth of a child. Two years after the legal claim for a child care slot
became effective, the German government decided for a law further promoting ma-
ternal employment. This policy is evaluated in the last article. The reform extended
the maximum receipt duration of part-time subsidies and hence, incentivizes for an
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early return in part time after child birth. The article exploits the exogenous ex-
posure to the reform for treatment determination and uses machine learning aug-
mented DiD estimation. The policy yields on average positive employment effects
until the child’s first birthday which are mainly driven by part-time work. Full-time
employment is not significantly affected suggesting that mothers do not substitute
a full-time contract with reduced hours and additional subsidies. However, these
effects do not persist until the child’s second birthday.
A major contribution of the second and third article is the provision of conditional
average treatment effects (on the treated). Targeted policy implementation requires
knowledge on the potential behaviour of specific subgroups. Unlike prior studies
that estimate effects for each particular subgroup and potentially suffer from mul-
tiple testing, the two articles use CATET estimation as firstly proposed by Abadie
(2005). He shows that reweighted outcomes of inverse probability weighting DiD
estimation can be used to project them on heterogeneity variables of interest. Re-
sulting coefficients directly give effect variation for the respective variable with valid
inference. The last article enhances the approach of Abadie (2005) by using machine
learning algorithms to estimate the reweighted outcome.
The subgroup analyses of the second and third article both demonstrate that either
mothers with lower school degree or income have smaller employment effects due
to the availability of child care slots or the part-time subsidy. The positive average ef-
fects are mainly driven by better educated or mothers with middle to higher income.
While employees with lower income are more often concerned by old-age poverty,
the findings reinforce the question how to mitigate this problem. The Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) finds that employment inter-
ruptions and short part-time work aggravate the issue of low pension entitlements
and are explaining factors for the high gender pension gap in Germany compared
to other OECD countries (OECD, 2019). Hence, future research and political action
should explicitly concentrate on the employment careers of poorly educated moth-
ers on the lower end of the income distribution.
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Tables
A.1 Chapter 2
TABLE A.1: Distribution of individual and partner’s characteristics
over discrepancy types
Women Men
nd ue oe nd ue oe
N 39,920 16,046 39,839 46,598 9,801 59,228
% 41.67 16.75 41.58 40.30 8.48 51.22
Personal characteristics
Career stage %
Learning stage 10.03 8.22 9.10 11.13 17.30 7.03
Career start 7.01 5.93 8.60 6.71 8.86 6.22
Establishing 9.32 8.82 11.62 9.94 10.85 11.23
Middle phase 33.76 39.90 31.90 32.32 30.59 33.63
up to 45 years
Middle phase 26.31 27.55 27.35 25.25 20.54 28.03
up to 55 years
Pre-retirement 12.44 8.87 10.99 13.05 10.16 13.15
Retirement 1.12 0.71 0.43 1.59 1.70 0.71
Children %
No children 67.45 53.60 72.75 65.08 66.23 62.11
Children le6 11.68 16.91 9.06 17.06 18.12 18.63
Children 7-10 9.61 13.07 7.83 8.41 7.17 9.18
Children 11-15 11.26 16.42 10.36 9.46 8.48 10.08
Child care facility %
No facility 39.12 35.07 38.11 50.15 49.67 47.27
Part-time facility 48.60 53.71 45.41 40.99 41.03 43.25
Full-time facility 12.27 11.23 16.48 8.86 9.31 9.48
Daily hours for 4.47 5.45 3.88 1.59 1.89 1.36
child care Mean
Daily hours for 2.10 2.48 1.72 0.66 0.81 0.60
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housekeeping Mean
Education and job %
No vocational degree 23.21 19.65 15.16 21.22 25.76 12.46
Vocational training 59.73 64.15 57.33 61.45 56.99 59.68
University degree 17.06 16.20 27.50 17.33 17.24 27.86
Occupational autonomy %
Apprenticeship 5.39 1.98 4.56 5.97 6.10 3.05
Low autonomy (= 1) 18.80 23.82 9.64 19.03 23.90 10.11
2 25.01 34.08 18.91 29.61 28.64 23.28
3 39.20 33.30 42.23 23.28 25.04 22.81
4 9.87 6.09 21.27 18.73 14.35 33.35
High autonomy (= 5) 1.73 0.73 3.39 3.38 1.98 7.41
Gross wage %
≤ 1st percentile 10.94 13.91 9.57 7.38 12.44 5.42
≤median 53.45 60.09 43.72 32.69 39.22 29.84
≤ 9th percentile 31.02 21.05 38.82 48.96 38.34 45.77
> 9th percentile 4.59 4.95 7.89 10.97 10.00 18.97
Partner
Partner %
No partner 29.80 28.33 30.89 26.99 32.48 21.52
Inactive, currently 10.33 8.28 9.28 25.15 24.59 24.21
in education
Active 59.87 63.39 59.83 47.86 42.93 54.27
Occupational autonomy %
Low autonomy (= 1) 14.51 14.70 10.47 22.61 20.01 13.03
2 25.31 27.14 23.24 25.49 25.81 23.49
3 24.82 25.01 24.96 37.66 39.54 43.35
4 28.96 28.15 33.82 12.19 13.07 17.19
High autonomy (= 5) 6.41 5.00 7.51 2.04 1.57 2.93
Daily hours for 1.52 1.51 1.69 5.91 6.22 6.10
child care Mean
Daily hours for 0.77 0.69 0.87 3.08 3.02 2.92
housekeeping Mean
Notes: nd=no discrepancy, ue=underemployed, oe=overemployed.
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP v33.1, 1985-2016. Pooled analysis.
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TABLE A.2: Estimation results for the creation of a discrepancy -
Additional covariates
Women Men Women Men
Underemployment Overemployment
Institutional child care (Reference Full-time slot)
No attendance 2.575 (0.86) 1.163 (0.33) 1.222 (0.63) 0.995 (-0.02)
Part-time slot 4.731 (1.30) 1.409 (0.68) 1.469 (1.19) 1.434 (1.28)
Children le6 * Period of child care expansion (Reference Children le6 * 1985-1995)
Children le6 * 1996-2005 2.971 (1.41) 2.225 (1.20) 0.823 (-0.43) 0.921 (-0.32)
Children le6 * 2006-2008 3.412 (1.55) 2.001 (0.86) 0.513 (-1.23) 0.993 (-0.02)
Children le6 * 2009-2016 2.015 (0.94) 1.790 (0.83) 0.627 (-1.08) 0.801 (-0.81)
Unpaid working hours
Child care 0.961 (-1.25) 1.052 (0.41) 0.879*** (-3.57) 1.033 (0.62)
Housework 0.962 (-0.48) 1.233 (1.09) 0.903* (-1.69) 0.867 (-1.59)
More than 20 employees * After introduction of legal claim for a part-time job
0.628 (-1.48) 1.054 (0.13) 0.936 (-0.33) 0.993 (-0.05)
N 7,303 5,121 15,884 23,343
n 1,895 1,335 3,950 5,454
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) of fixed effects-logit estimation. Instead of providing marginal effects,
odds ratios are indicated as they do not require plugging in a value for the unobserved component. The odds ratio gives
the multiplicative value for the odds if the explanatory variable increases by one unit. t-values in parentheses. Standard
errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 replications. Other than listed explanatory variables are mentioned in Section 2.3.3.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Abbreviations: Children le6 means younger than 7 years old.
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP v33.1, 1985-2016.
TABLE A.3: Estimation results for the resolution of a discrepancy -
Additional covariates
Women Men Women Men
Underemployment Overemployment
Institutional child care (Reference Full-time slot)
No attendance 1.356 (0.39) 0.555 (-1.07) 1.183 (0.43) 1.092 (0.33)
Part-time slot 1.377 (0.44) 0.431 (-1.43) 0.767 (-0.66) 1.295 (0.90)
Children le6 * Period of child care expansion (Reference Children le6 * 1985-1995)
Children le6 * 1996-2005 2.453 (1.12) 0.380 (-1.42) 1.555 (1.03) 1.065 (0.24)
Children le6 * 2006-2008 2.824 (1.22) 0.642 (-0.56) 1.343 (0.56) 0.771 (-0.86)
Children le6 * 2009-2016 1.487 (0.50) 0.358 (-1.51) 0.798 (-0.52) 1.028 (0.10)
Unpaid working hours
Child care 0.963 (-1.06) 1.081 (0.74) 0.934* (-1.95) 1.005 (0.08)
Housework 0.924 (-1.03) 0.836 (-0.99) 0.882** (-1.98) 1.057 (0.61)
More than 20 employees * After introduction of legal claim for a part-time job
1.131 (0.45) 1.460 (0.99) 1.033 (0.16) 0.882 (-0.81)
N 7,545 5,333 15,964 25,041
n 2,165 1,702 3,493 4,894
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) of fixed effects-logit estimation. Instead of providing marginal effects,
odds ratios are indicated as they do not require plugging in a value for the unobserved component. The odds ratio gives
the multiplicative value for the odds if the explanatory variable increases by one unit. t-values in parentheses. Standard
errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 replications. Other than listed explanatory variables are mentioned in Section 2.3.3.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Abbreviations: Children le6 means younger than 7 years old.
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP v33.1, 1985-2016.
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TABLE A.5: Conditional effects for job continuity and accumulated earn-
ings
Outcome D = 1, T = 0 AIPW
Mean sd coefficient se
Panel A: Middle income
Same employer 0.426 0.495 0.021 0.016
Accumulated earnings
1st year 1,049.87 2,942.71 304.47* 179.72
2nd year 6,981.35 8,791.76 244.00 481.68
N = 32, 139. Middle income corresponds to 2nd tercile of gross previous monthly income.
Reference group is low income.
Panel B: High income
Same employer 0.563 0.496 0.022 0.017
Accumulated earnings
1st year 1,382.94 4,359.20 473.79** 194.41
2nd year 11,984.46 12,674.35 342.07 521.10
N = 31, 166. High income corresponds to 3rd tercile of gross previous monthly income.
Reference group is low income.
Panel C: Prior full-time job
Same employer 0.563 0.496 -0.012 0.014
Accumulated earnings
1st year 1,933.89 6,089.10 -271.13* 164.59
2nd year 14,687.05 17,480.42 -680.89 441.14
N = 60, 913. Reference group is prior part-time or marginal employment.
Panel D: West Germany
Same employer 0.534 0.499 -0.031** 0.015
Accumulated earnings
1st year 1,728.85 5,622.98 128.28 169.09
2nd year 11,834.38 16,158.99 -335.38 453.24
N = 72, 508. Reference group is East Germany.
Note: Treatment status is measured six weeks around cut-off date excluding the two weeks
on each side of the cut-off date. T = 1 in 2015, T = 0 in 2014. The coefficients give the effect
variation for the respective subgroup. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and
establishment data from the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
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B.1 Chapter 3
FIGURE B.1: Histogram of child care coverage growth from 2011 to
2015.
Notes: Unweighted calculations based on 317 districts.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Federal
Statistical Office (2011b, 2015b).
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FIGURE B.2: Distribution of agreed working hours by group status
(a) Control group before reform (b) Control group after reform
(c) Treated group before reform (d) Treated group after reform
Source: Own calculations based on data from the German Microcensus and the Federal Statistical Office (2011b,
2015b).
FIGURE B.3: Distribution of preferred working hours by group status
(a) Control group before reform (b) Control group after reform
(c) Treated group before reform (d) Treated group after reform
Source: Own calculations based on data from the German Microcensus and the Federal Statistical Office (2011b,
2015b).
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FIGURE B.4: Propensity scores by treatment status
(a) D = 0 before trimming
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(b) D = 1 before trimming
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(c) D = 0 after trimming
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(d) D = 1 after trimming
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Notes: ND=0 = 46, 263 and ND=1 = 48, 212 before trimming; ND=0 = 46, 191 and ND=1 = 48, 184 after trimming.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and establishment data from
the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
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FIGURE B.5: Outcome means of treated mothers before reform (1)
(a) Low income (b) Middle income
(c) High income
Notes: T = 0 in 2014. Nlow_income = 8, 198, Nmiddle_income = 8, 288 and Nhigh_income = 8, 367.
Source: Own calculations based on employee data from the Employment History (BeH) and establishment data from
the Establishment History Panel (BHP).
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Mathemetical appendix
C.1 Chapter 4
C.1.1 Model details
Model set up
The decision problem of the mother in parental leave whether to stay out of the
labour force or to accept a part-time or full-time job offer can for any t > 0 be fully
described by the following Bellman equation:
VplT−t−1 = λy¯ + l +
1
1+ ρ
∫ ∞
0
max
pl, f ,p
(VplT−t, V
f
T−t, V
p
T−t)dF(yT−t) (C.1)
where we are agnostic about the particular form of the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the job offer incomes F(yT−t).
Reservation income
We first of all notice that for any t ≥ 0 the value functions for states f and p are given
by
V fT−t = yT−t
1+ ρ
ρ
and
VpT−t = (βyT−t + (1− β)l + D(ρ, t)τ(y¯− βyT−t))+
1+ ρ
ρ
where D(ρ, t) = 1−
(
1
1+ρ
)t+1
. Second of all, for period T we find
VplT = λy¯ + l +
1
1+ ρ
∫ ∞
0
max(VuT+1, V
f
T+1, V
p
T+1)dF(yT+1) such that
VplT − λy¯− l −
bu
ρ
=∫ ∞
0
max
(
0,
1
ρ
(yT+1 − bu), 1
ρ
(βyT+1 + (1− β)l − bu)
)
dF(yT+1) (C.2)
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for inserting the infinite series in Equations 4.1.
Moreover, we can explicitly solve for the value function VplT as
VplT = λy¯ + l +
bu
ρ
+
1
ρ
P(yT+1 > l, yT+1 > bu) (E(yT+1|yT+1 > l, yT+1 > bu)− bu)
+
1
ρ
P
(
yT+1 < l, yT+1 >
bu
β
− 1− β
β
l
)
∗
(
βE
(
yT+1|yT+1 < l, yT+1 > b
u
β
− 1− β
β
l
)
+ (1− β)l − bu
)
. (C.3)
Thus, iterating backwards will give an explicit solution for every VplT−t in the model.
In the non-stationary environment for any period t ≥ 0 the reservation income will
decline compared to the pre-period until it reaches the stationary solution in T + 1
as given above. We therefore derive an implicit solution for the reservation income
in the non-stationary environment. In particular, we have
VplT−t−1 − λy¯− l −
1
1+ ρ
VplT−t =∫ ∞
0
max
(
0,
yT−t
ρ
− 1
1+ ρ
VplT−t,
βyT−t + (1− β)l
ρ
+
D(ρ, t)τ(y¯− βyT−t)+
ρ
− 1
1+ ρ
VplT−t
)
dF(yT−t) (C.4)
such that we obtain the results of Equation 4.3.
Duration effects
The derivative of D(ρ, t) with respect to t can be written as
∂D(ρ, t)
∂t
= ln (1+ ρ)
(
1
1+ ρ
)t+1
> 0. (C.5)
C.1.2 Identification of ATET and CATET
Identification of ATET
The following identification result is taken from Zimmert (2018). It is given here for
convenience.
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We can write
E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X]
= E
[
E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X, T] ∣∣∣X]
= E
[
E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X, T = 1] P(T = 1|X)
+E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X, T = 0] (1− P(T = 1|X))∣∣∣X]
= E
[
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y1 −Y0 −E [Y1 −Y0|X, D = 0])
∣∣∣X]
= E
[
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y1 −Y0)
∣∣∣X]−E [ D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X))E [Y1 −Y0|X, D = 0]
∣∣∣X]
= E
[
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y1 −Y0)
∣∣∣X, D = 1] p(X)
+E
[
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y1 −Y0)
∣∣∣X, D = 0] (1− p(X))
−E [D− p(X)|X] E [Y1 −Y0|X, D = 0]
p(X)(1− p(X))
= E [Y1 −Y0|X, D = 1]−E [Y1 −Y0|X, D = 0]
where the third equality follows the fact that P(T = t|X) = λT and by the Observa-
tional Rule assumed. The existence of the expectation is guaranteed by the Common
Support condition.
Also analogous to the fundamental result of Heckman et al. (1997) we have
E
[
Y11 −Y01 |X, D = 1
]
= E [Y1|X, D = 1]−E
[
Y01 |X, D = 1
]
= E [Y1|X, D = 1]−E
[
Y01 −Y00 |X, D = 0
]−E [Y00 |X, D = 1]
= E [Y1 −Y0|X, D = 1]−E [Y1 −Y0|X, D = 0]
which follows by the Observational Rule, the No Anticipation and the Common
Trend assumptions. Therefore,
E
[
Y11 −Y01 |X, D = 1
]
= E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X] .
Denote the conditional density function of X given D = 1 as fX|D=1(x, d). Then
using the previous finding and by the law of iterated expectations similar to Abadie
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(2005), it follows that
ATET(1) = E
[
Y11 −Y01 |D = 1
]
=
∫
E
[
Y11 −Y01 |X, D = 1
]
fX|D=1(x, d)dx
=
∫
E
[
Y11 −Y01 |X, D = 1
] p(X)
λD
fX(x)dx
=
1
λD
E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
1− p(X) (Y− γ(X, T))
]
. q.e.d.
Identification of CATET
From the identification of the ATET we know that
E
[
Y11 −Y01 |X, D = 1
]
= E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X] .
For the CATET we therefore obtain
E
[
Y11 −Y01 |Z = z, D = 1
]
=E
[
E
[
Y11 −Y01 |X, Z = z, D = 1
]
|Z = z, D = 1
]
=E
[
E
[
Y11 −Y01 |X, D = 1
]
|Z = z, D = 1
]
=E
[
E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X] ∣∣∣Z = z, D = 1]
=
∫
X
E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X] fX|Z,D=1(x, z, d)dx
=
∫
X
E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X] fX,Z|D=1(x, z, d)
fZ|D=1(z, d)
dx
=
∫
X
E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X] fD=1|X,Z(x, z, d) fX,Z(x, z)
fD=1|Z(z, d) fZ(z)
dx
=
∫
X
E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
p(X)(1− p(X)) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X] p(X)
p(Z)
fX|Z(x, z)dx
=E
[
E
[
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
1− p(X) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣X] 1
p(Z)
∣∣∣Z = z]
=E
[
1
p(Z)
T − λT
λT(1− λT)
D− p(X)
1− p(X) (Y− γ(X, T))
∣∣∣Z = z]
which exists under the additional assumption that p(Z) > 0. q.e.d.
